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wacziarg@gsb.stanford.edu1 Introduction: Mortality Matters
What causes a country to be trapped in poverty? The dismal numbers - over a billion people
living on a less than $1 a day - do not lose, through familiarity, the capacity to shock. What
could be weighty enough to explain why so many stay so poor? Development occurs only if people
make provision for the future. If they see no future, there is no growth. We examine here a basic
determinant of decision horizons: the risk of premature death.
The causal relationship between mortality and poverty is clearly bi-directional. On the one
hand, in a poor country, unable to aﬀord sanitation and medical care, people die young. Figure
1 displays the strongly negative relationship between income levels and adult mortality. On the
other hand, where people have a short time horizon because they expect to die young, they have
less reason to save and the economy fails to grow. Figure 2 shows that countries with high adult
mortality also experience low rates of economic growth.
Both directions of causality, that poor countries have high mortality and that high mortality
leads to low growth, seem straightforward. However, the magnitude of these eﬀects remains unclear.
This paper argues that the link from adult mortality to growth is substantial and signiﬁcant, and
that the feedback eﬀect - poverty to high adult mortality to low growth - is part of the explanation
o fw h yl a r g e - s c a l ep o v e r t yp e r s i s t s . P o v e r t yl e a d st oh i g hm o r t a l i t y ,a n dt h i si nt u r ns t i ﬂes the
growth that would help countries escape poverty.
Does the adult mortality rate aﬀect income and economic growth? Conﬁrming our observation
from Figure 1, a glance at the raw adult mortality data shows that, as expected, mortality varies
with per capita income (Appendix 1). The safest country in the post-1960 period has been Sweden,
where a ﬁfteen-year-old’s probability of dying before reaching sixty is only 13 percent. The worst has
been Sierra Leone, where a ﬁfteen-year-old’s probability of dying before sixty is 57 percent. Yet per
capita income is not a perfect predictor of mortality. Cyprus, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Turkey have
adult mortality rates of 15 to 18 percent, better than France’s 19 percent and the United States’
20 percent. Furthermore, the spread of health knowledge to less-developed countries has led to
mortality rates converging more rapidly than income levels (Deaton, 2004, Becker et al., 2005). We
ﬁnd, nevertheless, that per capita income is signiﬁcantly associated with the mortality rate, and
that mortality is signiﬁcantly associated with growth. When potential biases from endogeneity and
measurement error are addressed with instrumental variables, our estimates of these eﬀects become
even stronger.
1As a check on the robustness of the mortality-growth relationship, we also analyze data across
states of India. Adult mortality (measured here as a twenty-year-old’s probability of dying before
reaching forty) varies from state to state: in West Bengal, it is 4 percent; in Assam, 7 percent.
Across Indian states, we again ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative association between adult mortality and
economic growth.
Our main argument is that people who expect to die young will fail to take actions, such
as saving and getting educated,t h a tg e n e r a t el o n g - t e r mb e n e ﬁts at short-term costs. Figures 3
and 4 display strong negative relationships between adult mortality on the one hand, and rates
of investment in physical and human capital on the other. Some corroboration of the inﬂuence
of mortality is provided by the converse: people who expect to die young will take actions that
involve short-term beneﬁts at long-term costs. A high death rate from exogenous causes could lead
to a high death rate from endogenous causes. Examples of such behaviors are unprotected sex and
smoking. We document below that high adult mortality in 1960-1980 is associated with high rates
of AIDS infection and death in 2002-2003. Similarly, we show that adult mortality is positively
associated with a variety of measures of tobacco use. The association of high adult mortality rates
with the decisions to smoke and to engage in activities leading to AIDS transmission arguably
reﬂects the short time horizons held by adults living in societies where fewer citizens reach old age.
Previous empirical and theoretical work has often ignored the distinction between adult mor-
tality, infant mortality, and life expectancy, taking them all to be proxies for a general concept of
"health." In this research, we focus particularly on adult mortality rather than the more commonly
used variables of infant mortality or life expectancy at birth. Although infant and adult mortality
are strongly correlated, the channels by which each might inﬂuence economic growth are theoreti-
cally distinct, and so it is informative to separate them. The premature death of an adult means
the total loss of any human capital investments and the inability of that adult to personally enjoy
the fruits of other investments. The death of an infant, while tragic and costly in its own right, has
less severe economic consequences.
Infant mortality, incidentally, varies more than adult mortality. Across countries, as noted, adult
mortality ranges from 13 percent to 57 percent. Infant mortality, measured as the probability a
child will die before the end of his or her ﬁrst year, ranges from less than 1 percent (in Sweden) to 19
percent (in Sierra Leone). Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that adult mortality has empirically distinguishable
eﬀects even controlling for infant mortality. Indeed, it is because much of the variation in total
2mortality and in life expectancy is driven by infant mortality that we need to be careful to use the
appropriate mortality measure. If the phenomenon in question relates speciﬁcally to adult mortality,
then investigating it using other measures could yield misleading statistical results. Moreover, our
understanding of the diﬀerent economic consequences of mortality at diﬀerent ages may inﬂuence
how policymakers choose to allocate scarce health resources.
The estimated eﬀects of high adult mortality on investment and growth, it turns out, are large
enough to account for Africa’s stagnation. Of the 40 countries with the highest adult mortality rates
in our sample, all are in Africa except three (Afghanistan, Laos, and Cambodia). In our sample
of 98 countries, Sub-Saharan African countries grew 1.65 percentage points more slowly than the
rest of the world, from 1960 to 2000, meaning that over the forty-year period covered by our data,
the gap in per capita incomes between Africa and the rest of the world doubled. In regressions
controlling for the usual determinants of growth, there is typically an unexplained residual, the
Africa dummy, roughly equal to 1 percentage point of annual growth (Collier and Gunning, 1999).
Yet once we add adult mortality to the growth regression, the Africa dummy becomes statistically
indistinguishable from zero.1 Thus, not only is adult mortality a statistically signiﬁcant predictor
of growth, it is also economically large.
This paper also considers how mortality aﬀects growth, examining several possible causal chan-
nels implied by theory. Estimating a system of equations, we ﬁnd that school enrollment, investment
rates, and fertility rates capture most if not all of the total eﬀect of adult mortality on economic
growth, with fertility and physical capital playing the major roles. While mortality appears to
aﬀect school enrollment rates, the further link between education and growth is tenuous in our
empirical results.
Our ﬁndings stand in contrast to those of Young (2005), who uses a calibrated simulation for
South Africa to forecast that survivors of the AIDS epidemic will be economically better oﬀ than
they would have been without an epidemic. This comes about in Young’s model because women
become more cautious about having sex for fear of infection, and because as others die out of
the workforce, female labor becomes more valuable. The consequent reduction in fertility leads to
higher living standards for survivors. In contrast, we ﬁnd empirically that higher adult mortality is
associated with higher fertility, more risky behavior, and economic stagnation. While our analysis
is retrospective, the forces identiﬁed in this paper suggest that the economic toll from AIDS may
1Note that the data are averaged over 1960 to 2000, so are not dominated by the AIDS epidemic.
3greatly exceed the direct costs of health care and destroyed lives.2
By examining the mechanisms through which death rates aﬀect growth, by considering various
measures of mortality, and by acknowledging that the joint determination of income and mortality
might drive a poverty trap, our paper attempts a comprehensive cross-national assessment of the
eﬀect of death on development.
In Section 2, we review conceptual arguments linking mortality to investment, human capital
accumulation, fertility and ultimately economic growth. In Section 3, we describe and discuss
the data on mortality used throughout this paper. In Section 4, we present simple cross-sectional
regressions for the determination of growth, investment, human capital accumulation, fertility and
several other variables, as a function of various mortality indicators. In Section 5 we try to identify
the causal eﬀect of adult mortality on these variables through the use of several instrumental-
variables techniques. Section 6 concludes.
2 How Mortality Aﬀects Growth
Our main hypothesis is that mortality aﬀects growth by inducing short-sighted behavior. Among
proximate determinants of growth, the accumulation of physical capital and of human capital, as
well as the rate of fertility, may all be aﬀected by the mortality rate.
2.1 Mortality and accumulation
Theory provides clear predictions on the eﬀect of mortality on investment. The elementary logic
is as follows: given an instantaneous utility function u(ct), a probability of survival of p,a n da
discount factor β, in a two-period model agents optimize u(ct)+pβu(ct+1). A reduction in the
survival probability p, like a reduction in the discount factor β, brings lower savings and investment
and thus lower growth. Since some of the gains of economic growth are in turn spent on improved
sanitation and medical care, this can in theory be self-reinforcing, as we will argue below. Among
various kinds of mortality, we would expect adult mortality rather than early childhood mortality
to aﬀect accumulation most, as decisions on physical and human capital accumulation are made in
or close to adulthood on the basis of returns they will yield in adulthood.
2Kalemli-Ozcan (2005) ﬁnds that AIDS increased fertility and lowered school enrollment between 1985-2000 in
many African countries.
4While this framework applies most easily to physical capital investment, it can be applied quite
readily to human capital accumulation as well: as the returns to human capital accrue over much of
adult life, a high incidence of adult mortality will reduce incentives to obtain an education.3 In fact,
the theoretical link between mortality and human capital investment is arguably even stronger than
that between mortality and physical capital investment: whereas parents with altruistic feelings
towards their children will beneﬁt indirectly from physical capital investments even if they are
unable to enjoy their fruits personally, an early death destroys human capital investments before
their full returns are realized.
The link between mortality and schooling is modeled by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000). A
reduction in mortality increases the individual’s time horizon and thus increases the incentive to
invest in human capital. Since lowered mortality aﬀects growth in part via wages and interest rates,
the eﬀects should be smaller in small open economies where wages and interest are ﬁx e db yw o r l d
markets. Calibrating their model using estimates of the return to schooling, Kalemli-Ozcan et al.
ﬁnd that a 1 percent reduction in mortality should lead to about a 1 percent increase in schooling.4
The empirical link between mortality and growth has previously been examined in several
articles. Shastry and Weil (2003) ﬁnd that adult mortality accounted for almost a third of the
variation across countries in levels of per capita income not explained by factor accumulation.
Turning to early modern Europe, Boucekkine et al. (2003) estimate that a steady decline in adult
mortality (while child mortality stayed level) accounts for 70% of the growth acceleration from
1700-1820. A larger literature focuses on the relationship between health outcomes and economic
growth. Bhargava et al. (2001) and Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2004) provide strong evidence for
a positive eﬀect of health on economic growth. Bleakley (2003) ﬁnds that eliminating hookworm, a
non-fatal condition aﬄicting children, boosted human capital accumulation in the American South.
Sachs (2001) builds on ﬁndings like these to present a policy case for boosting investments in health,
particularly malaria eradication, to promote economic development.
The issue of health and growth is related to, but distinct from, the issue of mortality and
growth. The health of a population may aﬀect growth because it reduces the time horizon of
3An early contribution on this topic is Ben Porath (1976), who argues that investments in education are a positive
function of an individual’s length of horizon.
4Zhang, Zhang, and Lee (2003) show theoretically that in highly developed societies, a growing population of
retirees may choose to vote down public education funding, thus stiﬂing growth. This mechanism is unlikely to be
important in the period and countries we consider.
5economic agents through increased mortality and therefore leads them to engage in short-sighted
behavior. However, the debilitating eﬀects of poorer health may also have a direct eﬀect on the
level and growth of productivity. This distinction is important to keep in mind when discussing
the relationships between health, mortality and growth.
While each of the previous papers represents a step forward in our understanding of the
mortality-growth linkage, each looks at only part of the picture. Much of the literature neglects
the hypothesis that mortality aﬀects growth, using mortality as an indicator of health, although as
we just argued the eﬀects of poor health are conceptually distinct from those of a short horizon.
Furthermore, mortality aﬀects growth through a variety of channels, but the relative magnitudes of
the eﬀects through each channel have not been systematically evaluated. In fact, most papers adopt
a reduced form approach which fails to identify any channels at all. By examining these channels
and other behavioral consequences of short time horizons we are able to partly disentangle the
separate eﬀects of health and mortality in a way that is impossible when attention is restricted to
the raw mortality-growth relationship. While data limitations - the paucity of direct measures of
health - prevent us from separately identifying the debilitating eﬀects of poor health from those of
a short horizon induced by high mortality, our empirical results overall are consistent with a major
role for mortality.
The past studies do not generally distinguish between the eﬀects of life expectancy at birth,
infant mortality, and adult mortality. These various types of mortality bear a priori distinct re-
lationships with economic variables. As we demonstrate below, adult mortality is a robust and
economically signiﬁcant predictor of economic growth, investment and fertility even when infant
mortality is controlled for. Also, existing research often neglects the endogeneity of mortality.
This endogeneity matters not only because it biases econometric estimates but also because the
mortality-growth interaction is the possible source of a poverty trap, as we argue below.
2.2 Mortality and fertility
There is a strong cross-sectional relationship between (adult) mortality and the rate of fertility. As
we document below, the relationship remains after controlling for various determinants of fertility,
particularly income and human capital indicators, and after several attempts to control for the
endogeneity of mortality. This is a consequence of the well-known demographic transition (Lee,
2003, Galor, 2004). In the demographic transition, mortality ﬁrst falls as a result of the adoption
6of better medical technologies, better hygiene, and better access to medical care (all of which are
a function of per capita income). Subsequently, fertility declines (Bloom and Canning, 2003).
Countries that have not started their demographic transitions feature high rates of mortality and
fertility. Countries that have completed their demographic transitions feature low rates of both
mortality and fertility. Thus there is a strong positive relationship between these two variables in
the cross-section, with only relatively few countries in the transition itself (low mortality but high
fertility), as displayed in Figure 5. Is any part of this correlation causal? The typical timing of the
mortality and fertility declines suggests that, if anything, causality should run from mortality to
fertility.
There is a lively theoretical debate on the link between mortality and fertility. Becker’s (1960)
quality-quantity theory stresses the role of income as a determinant of the fall in fertility. The
basic argument is that an increase in female earnings raises the value of working relative to caring
for children, shifting the terms of the trade-oﬀ between the quantity and the quality of children
in favor of the latter. This theory has little role for mortality as a determinant of fertility. In
Barro and Becker (1989), child mortality is introduced as a cost of having surviving children. A
fall in child mortality is expected to lead to a lower marginal cost of oﬀspring, raising parental
demand for children. Thus, in this theory, child mortality and net fertility are inversely related.5
Several recent papers have reinforced this theoretical ﬁnding, for instance Doepke (2004), Boldrin
and Jones (2002), Fernandez-Villaverde (2001), in models that build on Barro and Becker’s theory.6
A competing strand of models predicts that mortality and fertility are positively related, as
we observe in the cross-national aggregate data. In a model in which parents gain both old age
support and "companionship" utility from their adult children, Ehrlich and Lui (1991) ﬁnd that an
exogenous increase in the rate at which children survive to become productive adults can shift the
economy from a low-growth high-fertility equilibrium to a high-growth, low-fertility equilibrium.
In a model where parents only get utility for their integer number of surviving children, Sah (1991)
5In the demographic transition, net fertility also falls after the decline in mortality. The Barro-Becker model does
imply that the gross rate of fertility (number of children born per woman) is positively related to mortality. We used
a measure of net fertility instead of fertility in our empirical work and results obtained using either measure were
extremely similar. For a variety of reasons linked to its deﬁnition, net fertility is diﬃcult to capture and any measure
is likely to be more noisy than total fertility rates. Thus we retained the latter in our regressions.
6Hazan and Zoabi (2004) go further in a model where changes in adult longevity aﬀects neither fertility nor human
capital investment.
7shows that the number of births increases in the child mortality rate. The need for additional births
in order to avoid an undesirably low number of children is known as the "hoarding" or precautionary
motive, whereas births that occur after the loss of one child are referred to as replacement births
(Ben-Porath, 1976).
A compelling story linking exogenous mortality declines to a fall in fertility is provided in
Kalemli-Ozcan (2003). This model integrates a precautionary motive with education choices, show-
ing that hoarding will not occur when the mortality rate is identical within each family, but will
occur when uncertainty is taken into account. She states: "uncertainty about child survival gives
rise to a precautionary demand for children. Thus, exogenous reductions in mortality lead to a
decline in fertility and eventually in population growth". Where child mortality is high, parents
have a large number of children to try to ensure some of them survive. Moreover, the children’s
lowered mortality increases the return from investing in their education, and the reduction in fertil-
ity frees up resources to make this investment: lower adult mortality tips the scales in the trade-oﬀ
between the quantity and quality of children in favor of the latter. A reduction in child mortality
will thus lead to lower fertility and higher human capital investment. The reduction in fertility can
be expected to aﬀect not only human-capital investment but also per capita income growth directly,
by reducing population growth. Kalemli-Ozcan’s results require that marginal utility be convex in
surviving children, an assumption for which there is no direct evidence. While such assumptions
are controversial (Galor, 2004), they are common in the context of consumption theory (see for
example Carroll and Kimball, 1996).
Most of these models link child mortality to fertility, although it is not clear that their predic-
tions are limited to the eﬀects of child mortality as opposed to other concepts of mortality. The
models generally make the reasonable simplifying assumption that children either die young or live
out their lives. It is important to be careful when bringing such models to the data, however. If
parents derive utility not simply from the number and quality of their children who reach adult-
hood, but also from their children’s lifetime utilities, reproductive success, or ability to support the
parents in old age, adult mortality rates will also aﬀect parental fertility choices.
In most cases, it is suﬃcient when evaluating these models to keep in mind that what is referred
to in the model as child mortality should probably include adult mortality as well. In other models,
such as Doepke (2004), the theoretical results are driven by the assumption that deceased children
can mostly be replaced. This is plausible only if young children are the only ones lost. A look at the
8mortality data makes it clear that even without taking AIDS into account, adult mortality cannot
be neglected: for example, in Ecuador in 2000, about 4% of children born died before the age of 5,
but 7% of 15-year-olds did not survive to age 40. Fernandez-Villaverde (2001), Doepke (2004) and
Galor (2004) make much of the fact that in England, the major drop in infant mortality occurred
after the drop in fertility, arguing that this single departure for the general pattern invalidates any
causal link between mortality and fertility. This argument neglects adult mortality: in Europe from
the 16th to the mid-19th century "most gains in life expectancy are concentrated among adults
rather than children" (Boldrin and Jones, 2002). Taking that fact into consideration, the English
case looks less anomalous.
Soares (2005) presents one of the few models in which fertility is aﬀected not only by child
mortality but also by adult mortality. Altruistic parental utility is determined not just by the
number and quality of children, but also by the lifespans over which adult children will enjoy their
consumption. In this model, longevity increases can transform a Malthusian trap in which increased
fertility destroys any welfare gains from technological development or capital accumulation can be
transformed into an equilibrium with long-run growth.
Both theoretically and empirically, the relationship between mortality rates at diﬀerent ages and
fertility remains poorly understood. In our empirical work, we are careful to distinguish between
mortality rates at various ages. The strong results we obtain linking adult mortality and fertility
suggest that there would be a high return to further theoretical investigations of this link.
Our main interest is in the link between mortality and growth. However, as the literature
suggests and as we will conﬁrm empirically, a key channel linking mortality and growth is fertility.
One of the most straightforward consequences of most growth models is that high population
growth should reduce income levels. In the canonical Solow model a higher rate of population
growth reduces the capital-labor ratio in the steady-state and thus the steady-state level of income.
Thus, if mortality has a positive causal impact on fertility, fertility might be an important channel
whereby mortality aﬀects growth. Of course, population growth is decreasing in mortality by
deﬁnition, so the relationship depends on how tightly linked mortality and fertility changes are in
time, and on the rate at which changes in the death rate translate into changes in the birth rate.
In addition to the raw population eﬀects of fertility, parents with more children will have fewer
resources to devote to each child, the quality-quantity trade-oﬀ ﬁrst introduced by Becker (1960).
92.3 Mortality and poverty traps
Can the relationship between mortality and growth be the source of a poverty trap? In theory,
it can. A family of overlapping-generations models has established theoretically that a reduction
in mortality should be good for economic growth. Conversely, higher incomes may lead to lower
mortality. If the magnitudes of both of these eﬀects is suﬃciently large, poverty traps can emerge.7
Models constructed by Ehrlich and Lui (1991), Meltzer (1992), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), Chakraborty
(2004, 2005), and Soares (2005) explore this relationship in diﬀerent ways, but come to some
common conclusions: for certain parameter values, there may be multiple steady-states, creating
the possibility that a country gets trapped in a low-level equilibrium. Even if the steady-state
is unique, higher mortality countries invest less and grow more slowly. Putting mortality into a
growth model has the eﬀect of slowing the rate at which poorer countries’ capital-labor ratios and
per capita incomes converge to those of richer countries, possibly preventing convergence altogether.
Other models focus on the demographic transition, including fertility as a choice variable along
with human capital investment.8 A mortality drop causes a switch from a Malthusian equilibrium
in which population keeps up with production shifts to a pro-growth equilibrium with smaller
families and more human capital investment. These models are consistent with the basic facts of
the demographic transition around the world (Lee, 2003). Furthermore, as argued in Dasgupta
(2004), poor health might generate a poverty trap through the mechanism of poor health making
workers unproductive, and the resulting low incomes reinforcing poor health.9
In a recent survey, Azariadis and Stachurski (2004) note that while it is clear from the data that
poverty and wealth tend to persist, "poverty trap models tend to be lacking in testable quantitative
implications". Any poverty trap model will (by deﬁnition) predict a bimodal income distribution,
but it requires more eﬀort to prove that poverty traps rather than diﬀerences in initial conditions
7Various other mechanisms leading to poverty traps have been proposed (see the survey by Azariadis, 2001 and
Azariadis and Stachurski, 2004).
8Including Ehrlich and Lui (1991), Meltzer (1992), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), Soares (2005).
9See in particular Dasgupta and Ray (1986) for an early example of poverty traps based on "metabolic pathways".
These theories "are based on physiological links connecting nutritional status and work capacity among adults, and
those connecting nutritional status and physical and mental development among children" (Dasgupta, 2004). This is
essentially an eﬃciency wage argument centered on nutrition. Somep e o p l ew i l lb el o c k e di nu n e m p l o y m e n tb e c a u s e
it is better for employers to hire workers at a wage that ensures they are well-fed and productive, rather than lowering
the wage so that everyone could get a job at their (now lower) marginal productivity
10are to blame. They ﬁnd two empirical strategies promising. The ﬁrst assesses whether, controlling
for exogenous variables, countries conditionally converge to a single regime or to multiple regimes.
Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2003a), using this approach, ﬁnd that a likelihood ratio test rejects
the single-regime hypothesis where only geographical variables are considered to be exogenous.
However, while this supports the hypothesis that there is some kind of poverty trap, it provides no
evidence about the channels or mechanisms through which the trap works. The second approach is
that of Graham and Temple (2004), who run a calibrated numerical simulation of a speciﬁcp o v e r t y
trap model and ﬁnd that it explains 40 to 50 percent of the observed variation in incomes.
Whether a particular mechanism, in our case mortality, is a plausible empirical candidate to
generate a poverty trap depends on the magnitude of the relationships linking income and mortality.
We oﬀer evidence that the eﬀect of mortality on growth is economically large, suggesting that
mortality is a plausible candidate as a source of poverty traps.
3S o u r c e s a n d D e ﬁnitions of Mortality Data
3.1 Mortality and fertility measures
3.1.1 Mortality
Mortality can be measured in various ways. The most straightforward measure is the crude death
rate. This simply equals the number of deaths in a year divided by total population. However,
this variable is greatly inﬂuenced by the age structure of the population. Countries that have
experienced declining birth rates (such as the most developed economies) will have relatively top-
heavy age distributions. Since older people die at higher rates than the young, this will increase
the crude death rate. Similarly, holding the age-speciﬁc death rates constant, an economy with a
population bulge of young adults will have lower death rates because fewer of its members are in the
high-risk zones of childhood and old age. This population structure will occur when child mortality
drops without a corresponding drop in fertility, as occurs at the beginning of the demographic
transition. Thus, poor countries may look healthier by this measure than they would in a fair
assessment. For example, in our dataset, Sweden has a crude death rate of 10.62 per thousand,
while the Bahamas has a crude death rate of 6.32 per thousand.
Life expectancy at birth is the most commonly used summary measure of mortality. While its
name appears self-explanatory, the qualiﬁer "at birth" is important. Infant mortality, deﬁned as the
11fraction of children who die before their ﬁrst year, is a major source of variation in life expectancy
at birth. For instance, among American males in 1999, there were as many deaths before age one as
there were between the ages of one and nineteen combined (Bell and Miller, 2002). Note also that
life expectancy is not an expectation as commonly understood by statisticians and economists. It
is instead the expected lifetime of a child born in that period if all mortality rates remain constant
through the remainder of the child’s life.
Infant mortality is conventionally deﬁned as the fraction of children who die before their ﬁrst
birthday. Many of the major initial advances in health care worldwide have had their greatest eﬀect
through infant and child mortality, as basic sanitary practices were introduced, thus cheaply and
drastically lowering deaths due to infectious disease at these vulnerable ages (Bloom et al., 2003b,
p.26).
In this paper, we focus our attention mostly on the adult mortality rate.10 This is the probability
that a ﬁfteen-year old will survive until age sixty, given current age-speciﬁc mortality rates.11 Where






As an illustration, assume that the probability of an adult dying in a given year is a constant 1%.
The probability of surviving that year is then 99%. The probability of surviving 45 such years in
ar o wi s(0.99)45 =6 3 .6%, implying an adult mortality rate of 36.4%. In reality, the probability
of surviving each year generally declines steadily from age ﬁfteen on, making the fuller calculation
above necessary.
While the adult mortality rate between ages 15 and 60 is the most widely available, it is
sometimes more appropriate to consider mortality over younger age ranges. As we show below,
in the Indian cross-state dataset, adult mortality computed over the 20-40 age range is a better
predictor of cross-state growth. Those years are the beginning of productive adult life, coming
after most of the educational and other investments have been made in raising a child, but before
the economic returns to the family unit are realized. Thus deaths in this age-range can cause
10Fertility may aﬀect female adult mortality directly through a greater incidence of deaths in childbirth. As a
consequence, we focus on male adult mortality throughout this paper. The two series are very highly correlated (in
our sample, the correlations between male and female adult mortality averaged over 1960-2000 is 97.4%).
11Demographers refer to this mortality rate as 45q15, the probability of surviving 45 more years from age 15.
12the maximum economic loss. This may be particularly true in societies where physical labor is
important, such as India, since the capacity for physical labor decreases after this age.
3.1.2 Fertility
Fertility measures suﬀer from some of the same concerns as mortality measures. The crude birth
rate is simply the number of births per person per year. Along with the crude death rate it
determines (by deﬁnition) the population growth rate. However, like the crude death rate, it is
dependent on the age and gender structure of the population: populations with more young women
will have higher birth rates, all else equal. The total fertility rate, which we use, is thus the preferred
measure. The total fertility rate for a given year is the number of children that a typical female
would have over the course of her lifetime, assuming she survived through menopause and at each
age had children at the same rate as women of that age did during the year in question. Thus,
like life expectancy and adult mortality, it is a snapshot of behaviors of all the age groups in a
population at one time, not a forecast.
3.2 Data sources and limitations
The cross-country data for this study come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI).12 This data are assembled by the World Bank’s demographers based on based on life tables
from either the World Health Organization or the UN Population Division. Adult mortality rates
have been collected for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 1995, and 2000 for 163 countries, with an additional
25 joining the sample from 1990.13
The most reliable data come from countries with a complete vital registration system, where
every birth and death is recorded, generally with the age and the cause of death. Collecting such
data requires both that the state bureaucratic capacity be fairly well-developed and that the state
have the economic resources to allocate to the task. Many developing countries lack either the
motivation or the capabilities to gather these data reliably. Of the 155 economies included in the
2004 edition of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, fewer than half were assessed as
having complete vital registrations for that year. Historical data are of course even more limited.14
12The sources and descriptions of all the variables used in this study appear in Appendix 2.
13Annual data are only provided consistently for six countries, all of which are highly developed.
14We also constructed our own mortality dataset based on the World Health Organization’s Mortality Database.
13Where vital registration data are unavailable or incomplete, demographers use a variety of
techniques to estimate mortality. One common approach is to interview samples of the population
about the number, ages, and deaths of their children, their siblings, and their parents, allowing
projection to the larger population. In general, data on fertility, infant mortality and child mortality
(deaths prior to age 5) are considered to be reliable, because parents are able to provide accurate
birth histories and account for any deaths of their children. The quality of data on adult mortality
gathered by this method is lower, as adults can move away from and lose touch with family members.
Comparisons of the sizes of age cohorts between censuses provide another way to estimate mortality,
although this is highly sensitive to migration and changes in the completeness of census coverage
(Hill, 2003).
These data are then compared against tables relating mortality rates across diﬀerent age groups.
These model life tables were originally constructed based on the relative mortality rates of countries
with high-quality vital registration systems. Diﬀerent tables are available to represent diﬀerent
regions of the world. For instance, the widely-used Coale-Demeny "North" tables were based on
Scandinavian countries, where infant mortality tended to be lower, child mortality higher, and old
age mortality lower than elsewhere. A demographer then uses the model table that most closely
ﬁts the available data to complete the mortality estimates by age for that region (Murray et al.,
2000).
For some countries, chieﬂy in Africa, data from sampling methods are limited and the data on
adult mortality are sometimes obtained by imputati o n ,b a s e do no t h e rm o r t a l i t yd a t as u c ha si n f a n t
mortality. Thus, the quality of the data for Sub-Saharan Africa is the least satisfactory. Recent
data incorporate corrections for the impact of the AIDS pandemic on adult mortality in African
countries, and these corrections can also be questioned since age-speciﬁc AIDS mortality is rarely
observed directly in these countries. To the extent that adult mortality is estimated mainly from
This database includes absolute numbers of deaths and population by age groups as provided by participating
countries. A typical entry would be the number of reported deaths of men aged 20-24 in the United States for 1975.
From this data we calculated age-speciﬁc mortality rates for reach age grouping as the number of deaths divided by
population and then calculated adult mortality from this. Adult mortality rates for 1960, calculated in this fashion,
have a 67% correlation with those provided in the WDI. The correlation between the two measures rises to 95% for
1990. These rates are not perfectly correlated because the life tables used for the WDI may involve some subjective
judgment and smoothing by the demographer. The WHO database only includes countries that choose to submit
data to the WHO, which excludes most of Africa. We conducted our empirical analysis using this dataset and derived
qualitatively similar results to those obtained using the WDI dataset.
14infant mortality, in possibly nonlinear ways, without any additional input from other data sources,
adult mortality estimates for poor and/or African countries might largely be a function of infant
mortality.15 This could aﬀect our estimates in two ways. First, it will lead to higher measurement
error, since true mortality will be estimated with noise. Second, it will make the separate identiﬁ-
cation of the adult mortality and infant mortality eﬀects more diﬃcult in speciﬁcations that control
for both, since by construction these variables will be (possibly nonlinear) functions of each other
for a subsample of the data: identiﬁcation will be obtained largely oﬀ the variation in the richer
countries.
These largely inescapable drawbacks of the available mortality data can be addressed in several
ways. First, we show below that our results hold up when we exclude from our sample Sub-Saharan
African countries, for which the data problems are most acute. Second, the African adult mortality
data are still informative, even when they are largely based on projections from survey-based
estimates of infant and child mortality. In a recent paper given to a UN workshop, Kenneth Hill,
the Director of the Johns Hopkins Population Center concluded that the UN’s "model life tables
generally ﬁt the age patterns of mortality reasonably well, though they tend to underestimate
young adult male mortality in most populations... and cannot represent the age patterns associated
with the HIV/AIDS epidemic".16 The underestimation of young adult male mortality may partly
explain why fairly small increases in mortality in our data can have substantial eﬀects on long-run
growth.
As noted by the World Bank’s specialists, the "adequacy of mortality estimates also depends
on what they are being used for... to document short-term ﬂuctuations, and even more so to
link them to a changing socioeconomic environment, requires far greater detail than can often be
obtained" (Bos et al., 1992). We believe that this makes higher frequency econometric techniques
(such as panel data methods) an inappropriate use of these data, so we focus long-run averages.
15Surprisingly, for the subsample of Sub-Saharan African countries in our dataset, the raw correlation between
adult mortality and infant mortality averaged over 1960-2000 is 0.53, which is actually lower than the full sample
correlation of 0.87. The correlation for the 1960 African data is only 0.38 (0.80 in the full sample). Similar correlations
of infant mortality with life expectancy are much higher (on the order of −0.85 for Sub-Saharan Africa and −0.95
for the whole sample, for both 1960 and 1960-2000 averages). We are grateful to Angus Deaton for pointing out this
fact.
16This last point is not crucial for the purposes of our paper. We are primarily concerned with the eﬀects of young
adult mortality on growth in the period prior to the 1990s, and HIV-related increases in mortality rates are primarily
a phenomenon of the 1990s.
15Such averages also reduce the incidence of measurement error.
In addition to the cross-country sample, we also collected cross-state data from India. While
India is not considered to have comprehensive vital statistics coverage by developed-country stan-
dards, since 1970 it has had in place a well-regarded system called the Sample Registration System.
In this system, vital statistics are gathered and double-checked each year in a random sample of
several thousand villages and urban blocks around the country. From these data overall birth and
death rates can be estimated. Mortality rates for ﬁve-year age ranges were compiled based on these
data for each state and union territory by India’s Registrar General for the years 1971-1997. We
then used these death rates to calculate adult mortality directly.
The following sections will show that our ﬁndings are robust to the use of a variety of subsamples
and empirical approaches, giving us conﬁdence that these results are not simply driven by ﬂaws in
the collection of the data.
4 Mortality and economic outcomes: empirical linkages
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Tables 1a and 2a present summary statistics and correlations for the main variables of interest in
the cross-country dataset. Table 1a provides the means and standard deviations of these variables,
which can be used to assess the magnitude of the eﬀects estimated below. The demographic vari-
ables, averaged over the period 1960-2000, display substantial variation. Not surprisingly, Table
2a shows that the correlations among the various measures of mortality are high: the correlations
between infant mortality, adult mortality and the crude death rate range from 0.87 to 0.89,s u g -
gesting that multicollinearity might be an issue in the regressions. Perhaps more surprisingly, the
fertility rate is highly correlated with our various measures of mortality. Below, we investigate the
empirical relationship between fertility and mortality in detail.
The corresponding summary statistics for the India dataset are presented in Tables 1b and
2b. Similar observations hold in this alternative dataset: correlations are quite high among our
various measure of mortality, but lower than in the cross-country dataset. The lower extent of
multicollinearity suggests that the inclusion of these measures jointly in cross-state regressions may
lead to more consistent results across speciﬁcations (as we indeed ﬁnd below). For the India dataset
our measure of mortality refers to the probability of dying by age 40 conditional on reach age 20.
16This is actually a somewhat better measure of prime-age mortality, as it avoids measuring the
age-related maladies that become signiﬁcant causes of death by age 50.17 Obviously, the average
probability of dying is much lower for the shorter 20-40 age range than it is for the 15-60 range.
4.2 OLS growth estimates
4.2.1 Economic growth in a cross-section of countries
The ﬁrst step in our empirical analysis is to examine the partial correlations between growth of
income per capita and the various mortality measures. We start with the simplest possible approach:
OLS regressions of economic growth on log initial income per capita and an increasingly large set
of controls, with each variable averaged over the 1960-2000 time period in order to reduce bias due
to measurement error.18 We explore several speciﬁcations, adding control variables progressively
to assess the robustness of the mortality variables, as well as their relative importance. Table 3
displays the least squares results.
The ﬁrst lesson from this exercise is that adult mortality rate is a very signiﬁcant predictor of
growth when entered alone with the log of initial per capita income (column 1). The coeﬃcient
is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The adjusted R-squared from a simple regression of
income growth on log initial income is 0.04. The adjusted R-squared rises to 0.46 simply by adding
the adult mortality rate, suggesting that a large portion of the cross-country variation in economic
growth might be attributable to this variable. Of course, it is critical to control for other measures of
mortality which may be highly correlated with adult mortality and whose eﬀects may be picked up
by the latter. Importantly, column 2 shows that despite the high collinearity between the measures
of mortality, the impact of adult mortality holds up when we control for other mortality rates, i.e.
infant mortality and the crude death rate.19 Crude mortality is only weakly related to growth,
17Using data from the World Health Organization, we constructed a similar variable for the cross-country sample,
with results similar to those discussed below. However, we chose to rely primarily on the World Bank data described
earlier as it is available for a much larger set of countries. This dataset does not include the 20-40 adult mortality
rate.
18See Hauk and Wacziarg (2004), for a discussion of the virtues of simple OLS estimators, in terms of limiting the
incidence of classical measurement error bias in the cross-country context.
19The coeﬃcient on adult mortality is also robust to the inclusion of the child mortality rate in the regression.
These results are available upon request. Measures of child and infant mortality bear a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.99
in the cross-section of countries, so using one or the other makes very little diﬀerence.
17and its sign changes depending on the controls used. Despite high collinearity between adult and
infant mortality, we are able to identify the eﬀects of each variable separately: both bear a negative
relationship with growth.
One variable that does sharply reduce the signiﬁcance of adult mortality is the fertility rate.
Out of a large set of the control variables that we included in the regression, fertility was the only
one that consistently made mortality insigniﬁcant. Indeed, column 3 shows that the coeﬃcient
on adult mortality is sensitive to the inclusion of the fertility rate in the regression: it remains
negative but its magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance fall. This result, which remains when we
include additional controls in the regression (column 5), suggests that the interplay between fertility
and adult mortality may be an important channel whereby adult mortality could indirectly aﬀect
economic growth. Thus, we will reexamine the empirical relationship between adult mortality
and fertility when we explore these channels in Section 5.20 In interpreting these results, one
should remember that all our demographic variables are highly collinear. The correlation between
fertility and adult mortality averaged over the 1960-2000, for instance, is 0.80. If these variables are
measured with some error, as they surely are, these high correlations make it diﬃcult to tell which
one dominates statistically in any given speciﬁcation. As discussed above, the measurement error
for adult mortality is likely to be higher than that for fertility in developing countries, probably
increasing the estimated coeﬃcient of fertility at the expense of adult mortality.
Next, we include a series of other control variables besides the log of initial per capita income.
We follow the baseline growth speciﬁcations in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1996) and Alesina, Spolaore
and Wacziarg (2000), namely we control for government consumption as a share of GDP, the rate of
investment, the secondary school gross enrollment ratio, openness (measured by the trade to GDP
ratio), the log of population and its interaction with openness. The estimates of the coeﬃcients on
20We also tried to control for life expectancy (results are available upon request). This variable, averaged over 1960-
2000, bears a 96% correlation with the adult mortality variable that we use. When including life expectancy at birth
instead of adult mortality, this variable came out positive and highly signiﬁcant (except when fertility was controlled
for). When both variables were included, both lost signiﬁcance due to the very high level of multicollinearity. This
ﬁnding is interesting since results in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1996) show life expectancy to be one of the most
consistently signiﬁcant correlates of growth across countries. Adult mortality and life expectancy capture roughly
similar concepts, i.e. the ﬁrst measures the probability of surviving to reap the returns to various forms of investment
and the second captures the number of years over which this return can be accumulated and enjoyed. However, life
expectancy is also strongly determined by infant and early childhood mortality, making adult mortality the more
appropriate variable for testing our theory.
18these control variables all have the expected signs. The coeﬃcient on adult mortality is reduced
slightly in magnitude, but remains signiﬁcant at the 1% level (column 4). When we remove the
mortality variables from this regression, its adjusted R-squared falls from 0.68 to 0.58,s u g g e s t i n g
that measures of mortality (chief among them the adult mortality rate) can explain roughly an
additional 10% of cross-country variation in growth when other controls are included. Again, when
we add fertility to the equation (in column 5), the estimated coeﬃcient of adult mortality drops
below conventional signiﬁcance levels. The high collinearity between fertility and adult mortality,
which generates sensitivity in the coeﬃcient on adult mortality, is again consistent with the view
that fertility might be a channel through which mortality operates. We will explore this hypothesis
in a more structured model in Section 5, where we will attempt to quantify the importance of
diﬀerent channels.
The magnitude of the partial correlation between adult mortality and growth is substantial.
Using estimates in the baseline regression of column 4, a one standard deviation in adult mortality
(equal to 0.136) is associated with a 0.72 percentage point diﬀerence in growth. Moving from the
75th percentile of adult mortality (Cambodia) to the 25th percentile (the USA) brings an extra 1.39
percentage points of growth holding all the included determinants of growth constant.
4.2.2 Extensions and robustness checks
In Table 4, we consider extensions to the basic OLS speciﬁcation. First, we consider whether high
adult mortality might account for Africa’s growth tragedy. As we pointed out above, most of
the world’s high-mortality countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa. In column 1, we run the baseline
regression without the mortality measures, but with standard growth controls, plus a dummy
variable for Sub-Saharan Africa. The dummy variable bears an estimated coeﬃcient of about
minus one percentage point, Africa’s "missing growth".21 Running the same regression with adult
mortality included (column 2), we ﬁnd that the Africa eﬀect becomes positive and statistically
21See Collier and Gunning (1999) for more on Africa’s growth tragedy. See also Easterly and Levine (1997) who ﬁnd
as i g n i ﬁcant negative eﬀect of the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy, even after controlling for a set of growth determinants
(somewhat diﬀerent from ours) and a measure of ethnic fractionalization. The latter reduces but does not eliminate
the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy, while in our regressions adult mortality eliminates the eﬀect entirely. The coeﬃcient
on adult mortality is insensitive to the inclusion ofam e a s u r eo fe t h n i cf r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o ni no u rs p e c i ﬁcation.
19indistinguishable from zero.22 Thus, in a statistical sense, adult mortality can account for all of
the growth shortfall experienced in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1960 and 2000.
A major source of collinearity between adult mortality and fertility is the demographic tran-
sition. Countries that have not started their demographic transitions display both high mortality
and high fertility. Countries that have completed their demographic transitions display both low
mortality and low fertility. These countries drive the high correlation between these variables in our
dataset. Figure 5 shows this graphically. For the intermediate countries, the correlation between
adult mortality and fertility is much lower. In a subsample where the collinearity between fertility
and adult mortality is lower because countries are caught during their demographic transitions
(rather than mostly before or after it takes place), adult mortality remains a strong predictor of
economic growth even after controlling for the fertility rate. Column 3 of Table 4 isolates 40 mid-
transition countries in which adult mortality falls between 0.2 and 0.5. In this regression, the eﬀect
of mortality is negative, large in magnitude and statistically signiﬁcant, even when we control for
fertility.
The conﬁrmation of our result in this subsample, which excludes both most African countries
and the highly developed nations, also suggests that these results are not driven by systematic
mismeasurement in Africa or solely by the stark distinction between the richest and poorest nations.
As a further check of this, we reran our baseline regressions excluding Sub-Saharan Africa but
including the rest of the developing world (most of which has higher-quality data). The coeﬃcient
estimates on the mortality variables were very close to those derived without the Africa data,
although their signiﬁcance levels were lower, due to the much smaller sample size.23
Next, we examine the role of war and war casualties (columns 4 and 5 of Table 4). Countries
that have experienced the turmoil of war may experience low growth because of damaged political,
social, and economic institutions. At the same time, their mortality rates will be higher, leading
to possibly wrong inferences that mortality accounts for low growth. We consider four variables to
capture the eﬀects of wars, keeping intra-state (civil) wars and inter-state wars separate because
their disruptive eﬀects are not necessarily comparable.24 One measure of the impact of war is total
22Note also that Sub-Saharan Africa is not driving the estimated coeﬃcient of adult mortality. Similar regressions
excluding African countries yield the same result, as we discuss below.
23These regressions are available upon request.
24Consider how the deaths of a thousand US soldiers in a foreign theater would diﬀer in economic impact from the
20battle deaths from 1960-1997, divided by average population. Battle deaths from actual combat
are a fairly minor source of mortality over the entire period, but we take them to be a reasonable
proxy for the total disruption caused by wars. Comparing the regressions in Table 4 with column
4 of Table 3, it appears that including war deaths slightly reduces the coeﬃcient and signiﬁcance
of adult mortality, but this is entirely due to sample selection (we lose 5 somewhat inﬂuential
observations by using the battle deaths data). As the battle death numbers are imperfect, we also
use war duration in months, a proxy that can be more reliably measured. Including all four war
variables further reduces the coeﬃc i e n to na d u l tm o r t a l i t y .
Surprisingly, casualties from and time spent in inter-state wars appear to bear a somewhat
positive relationship with growth, while intrastate wars bear a somewhat negative relationship
with growth. Of the four variables, only interstate battle deaths and months of intrastate war are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level, but an F-test for the joint signiﬁcance of the four variables
gives a p-value of 0.049. A variety of other war-related controls that we tried did not have any
signiﬁcant eﬀect, nor did they substantially reduce the estimated coeﬃcient of adult mortality.
While these results are interesting, they are not very informative with respect to our hypothesis.
It would be surprising if war were not both somewhat collinear with adult mortality and also bad
for growth. In addition, theory does not require people to fear premature death for any particular
reason: war, starvation, or disease would all have the same eﬀect of shortening time horizons.
Next, to assess the possibility that adult mortality can capture the eﬀect of institutional quality,
we control for two measures of institutions (columns 6 and 7). Expropriation risk, a survey-based
measurement of institutional quality, was previously used in Acemoglu et al. (2001). Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005) argue that an index of constraints on the executive is a better measure of institutions
because it is more objective and thus less likely to be conﬂated with wealth. In column 6 of Table
4, using our baseline speciﬁcation, controlling for expropriation risk in 1990 has almost no eﬀect
on the coeﬃcient or signiﬁcance level of adult mortality, although expropriation risk does come up
as signiﬁcant in its own right. In column 7, including the second measure of institutional quality
(constraints on the executive, average of 1970 and 1990 values), actually raises the estimated
magnitude and coeﬃcient of adult mortality, while the estimated coeﬃcient on the institutions
variable is statistically indistinguishable from zero.25 These results suggest that if institutions
same thousand deaths occurring in an intra-US secession war.
25Measures of institutional quality, such as indices of democracy, often come out insigniﬁcant in cross-country
21matter for growth rates, their eﬀects are in addition to the eﬀects of mortality, rather than being
the sole explanatory variable. It may well be that good health-care institutions tend to go along
with good political and economic institutions, but each has separate eﬀects.
Finally, we carried out an outlier analysis. Only one outlying observation is notably inﬂuential:
South Africa. Excluding it from the sample used in column 5 of Table 3 increases the coeﬃcient
estimate of adult mortality from −2.94 to −4.64, and increases the t-statistic from 1.47 to 2.58.
None of the other coeﬃcients change substantially from this exclusion. Excluding one-by-one the
other thirteen observations for which the growth rate diﬀers from the predicted value by more than
1 percentage point (1.38 standard deviations) changes the coeﬃcient on adult mortality by 0.57 at
most. The model in Table 3, column 5 predicts a growth rate of 0.11 for South Africa, as opposed
to its actual growth of 1.05.26
To summarize, adult mortality is a consistently signiﬁcant predictor of economic growth across
countries. The magnitude of the eﬀect is large and the variable accounts for a substantial portion
of cross-country variation in growth, as well as for Africa’s growth tragedy. However, the eﬀect is
reduced and its statistical signiﬁcance eliminated if we include the fertility rate in the regression.
Of course, OLS regressions simply reﬂect partial correlations, not causal eﬀects, an issue we address
in Section 5.
4.2.3 Mortality and growth across Indian States
As an additional check on the robustness of our ﬁndings, we attempt to approximate the same
growth speciﬁcations using a dataset we have gathered for Indian states. Our demographic variables
are directly comparable to those used in the cross-country dataset in terms of deﬁnitions and units.
Many control variables, in contrast, diﬀer due to data availability issues. Given the small number
of Indian states with available data, we ran both cross-sectional regressions (using the between
estimator) and panel random-eﬀects regressions exploiting the availability of data at the decade
level.27 The latter are likely to deliver more reliable results given that all regressions involving
growth speciﬁcations. This stands in contrast with their estimated eﬀect on income levels. See Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (2001) for compelling evidence on the latter.
26South Africa’s status as an outlier should also be kept in mind when evaluating the relevance of Young’s (2005)
study of South Africa to the AIDS crisis elsewhere.
27This requires giving up the reduction in measurement error bias resulting from time averaging, but is made
necessary by the paucity of observations.
22our mortality measures cover at most 19 states (we are able to obtain up to 47 observations when
exploiting the panel dimension). Our regressions cover the period 1970-2000, with one observation
per decade.
Results from the Indian dataset, displayed in Table 5, closely resemble those obtained using the
cross-sectional dataset.28 One noteworthy aspect of growth across Indian states is divergence in
per capita income, as shown by the signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient on the log of initial per capita
income in column 1 of Table 5.29 While we cannot account for divergence in per capita income
by conditioning on adult mortality alone, this variable is by far the most robust partial correlate
of cross-state growth in India. Given the data limitations and the small number of observations,
this is a strong result. The coeﬃcient is robust to the inclusion of a broad range of controls,
including other death rates (infant mortality, child mortality and the crude death rate), as well as
other potential determinants of cross-state growth such as the literacy rate, the urbanization rate,
religious fractionalization, and federal development assistance. In contrast to our ﬁndings using the
cross-country data, the eﬀect of adult mortality is also robust to the inclusion of the fertility rate
in the cross-state growth speciﬁcation (columns 3 and 7).
In terms of magnitudes, focusing on the random eﬀects speciﬁcation in column 4 of Table 5,
which includes a wide range of controls, a one standard deviation diﬀerence in adult mortality
(equal to 0.013) is associated with a 1.04 percentage point diﬀerence in growth of per capita net
state domestic product (this is to be compared to the standard deviation in 1970-2000 economic
growth across states in India, 1.78 percentage points). This eﬀect is slightly larger but roughly
in line with that obtained in the cross-country regressions. Adult mortality accounts for 1.67
percentage points of the growth diﬀerence between a state at the 75th percentile of adult mortality,
such as Kerala (with a male adult mortality rate at ages 20-40 of 4.5% in 1991), and a state at the
25th percentile, such as Madhya Pradesh (with a male adult mortality rate of 6.7% in 1991). This is
v i r t u a l l ya l lo ft h eg r o w t hd i ﬀerence between Kerala and Madhya Pradesh in the 1990s. Again, we
see that the economic magnitude of growth diﬀerences associated with diﬀerence in adult mortality
is very large.
28We ran many more speciﬁcations for cross-state growth in India than are shown in Table 5. In all these speciﬁ-
cations, adult mortality remained signiﬁcant. The results are available upon request.
29This has been observed previously by Ghosh, Marjit and Neogi (1998), among others
234.3 Behavioral consequences of adult mortality
Adult mortality is likely to impact growth by reducing incentives to engage in behavior that yield
long-term beneﬁts at short-term costs. Examples of such behavior are investment in physical capital
(and more generally entrepreneurship) and investment in human capital. Adult mortality also raises
incentives to engage in behavior with short-term beneﬁts but long-term costs, such as smoking or
engaging in activities associated with contracting the virus that causes AIDS. Finally, as discussed
earlier, higher fertility bears a robust empirical link with higher mortality.
In this section, we investigate these relationships empirically. We examine how adult mortality
relates to investment, human capital accumulation, fertility, the death rate from AIDS and several
measures of tobacco use and consumption. Since the required data are not available across Indian
states, we look only at the cross-country dataset. We have two goals. First, we are primarily
concerned with partial correlations, to assess whether adult mortality has any potential to explain
vast cross-sectional growth diﬀerences. The results here paint a picture consistent with the theory
discussed in Section 2, without necessarily implying causality. Second, the estimates of the channels
through which mortality aﬀects growth provide a reference point for the systems estimates presented
in Section 5.
4.3.1 Channel variables
Adult Mortality and Physical Capital Investment. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 show that
high adult mortality is associated with a reduction in the investment rate. Column 2 controls
for the crude death rate, the infant mortality rate, and other controls based on the speciﬁcation
for the investment rate equation in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1996). In that speciﬁcation, a one
standard deviation increase in the male adult mortality rate is associated with a 2.81 percentage
point reduction in the investment rate. This is a sizable eﬀect, considering that the mean of the
investment rate in our sample is 15.12%. As theory would predict, infant mortality does not bear
as i g n i ﬁcant relationship with the investment rate.
Adult Mortality and Human Capital Accumulation. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 display
the correlates of human-capital accumulation. Following Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), we
use the enrollment rate in secondary education as a measure of human capital investment.30 The
30Our measure of enrollment diﬀers slightly from Mankiw, Romer and Weil’s (1992), who used the gross enrollment
r a t i oi ns e c o n d a r ye d u c a t i o nm u l t i p l i e db yt h ef r a c t i o nof the working age population aged 15 to 19. We use the gross
24human-capital augmented Solow model implies that this ﬂow rate is theoretically more appropriate
than a stock measure of human capital. However, the secondary enrollment rate is highly correlated
with commonly used stock measures, themselves constructed from enrollment data (see Barro and
Lee, 2000): the correlation between the secondary school enrollment rate and the number of years
of primary, secondary and higher schooling in the adult population is 90.5%, and results obtained
using these alternative measures are close.31
Adult mortality is negatively associated with human capital accumulation, and this eﬀect is
statistically signiﬁcant. It remains signiﬁcant when infant mortality and the crude death rate are
added to the equation, and when other controls are included. Again, the magnitude of the eﬀect is
sizable: using the estimates in column 4, which includes standard controls, a one standard deviation
increase in adult mortality is associated with a 9 percentage point decrease in the enrollment rate
(this is about a third of the average country’s enrollment).
The signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient estimate for infant mortality is somewhat surprising, from
a theoretical point of view. There is no obvious reason why infant mortality should aﬀect the
secondary school enrollment rate. This probably comes about because infant mortality is corre-
lated with childhood mortality in the secondary-school years and with the general health of the
population, both of which should aﬀect enrollment.
Adult Mortality and Fertility. Columns 5 and 6 address the determinants of the total fertility
rate. As we suggested above, the relationship between adult mortality and fertility appears to be
central in accounting for the relationship between adult mortality and economic growth. Fertility is
signiﬁcantly positively associated with adult mortality and with infant mortality, and both variables
have separately signiﬁcant eﬀects. The partial correlation between adult mortality and fertility is
again very large in magnitude: using the speciﬁcation in column 6, controlling for several other
determinants of fertility, a standard deviation increase in adult mortality is associated with a 0.56
point increase in the fertility rate. This strongly supports the idea that fertility decisions are not
simply determined by the number of children expected to survive early childhood, but rather reﬂect
a more sophisticated set of preferences aﬀected by the risks the child will face throughout life.
enrollment ratio since it is more widely available for a broad panel of countries. The correlation between our gross
enrollment ratio and Mankiw, Romer and Weil’s schooling variable for the overlapping sample and period (1960-1985)
cross-sectional average is 95.4%, so the diﬀerence should be immaterial in practice.
31For further discussion of the measurement of human capital, see Bils and Klenow (2000).
254.3.2 Corroborative evidence
Adult Mortality and the AIDS pandemic. The next set of regressions seeks to predict the
prevalence of AIDS in 2001 as a function of variables observed before the AIDS pandemic emerged.
If high adult mortality leads to increases in behavior with short-term beneﬁts but long-term costs,
we would expect it to be associated with the spread of AIDS. The results of OLS regressions for the
determination of the AIDS death rate are displayed in the ﬁrst three columns of Table 7. We ﬁnd
statistically signiﬁcant evidence that adult mortality over 1960-1980 is positively associated with
the death rate from AIDS, across all speciﬁcations. The ﬁnding is robust even to the inclusion of
the fertility rate, despite its high collinearity with adult mortality. The estimated eﬀect is large:
using the estimates in column 3 of Table 7, a one standard deviation increase in 1960-1980 adult
mortality (equal to 0.09) is associated with a 1.40 death per thousand increase in the AIDS death
rate. For comparison, the mean of the AIDS death rate in 2001 was 1.39 per thousand, so the eﬀect
is slightly more than the mean of the dependent variable.
There are two possible interpretations of this ﬁnding, not mutually exclusive. The ﬁrst is
behavioral, along the lines described above: people who are already likely to die of other causes
will be more prone to engage in risky behavior yielding short-term beneﬁts at longer term costs.
An alternative explanation is medical: in locations where adults are at greater risk of dying,
for instance due to a pre-existing prevalence of communicable diseases and limited medical care,
a further weakening of their immune systems through the virus that causes AIDS will result in a
larger number of deaths classiﬁed as AIDS related. To try to discriminate between these two stories,
we used the proportion of adults living with AIDS as an alternative dependent variable. Relative to
mortality rates from AIDS, any association between this variable and (pre-AIDS) adult mortality
is more likely to reﬂect the behavioral interpretation rather than the medical interpretation.
The results are in the last three columns of Table 7. The statistical signiﬁcance of adult mortality
is even stronger than before: adult mortality in 1960-1980 is consistently negatively related to the
prevalence of AIDS in the adult population in 2003. Using the estimates in column 6, a one standard
deviation increase in adult mortality is associated with a 4.40 percentage point increase in the share
of the adult population living with AIDS. For comparison, the mean of this variable is 2.72,s ot h e
eﬀect is large. These regressions provide further evidence that high adult mortality is associated
with behavior characterized by short-term beneﬁts and long-term costs.
26Smoking and Adult Mortality. The ﬁnal set of OLS regressions we report relates to the
relationship between tobacco use and adult mortality. Smoking is a quintessential activity with
short-term beneﬁts and long-term costs, so the propensity to smoke should be related to agent’s
time horizons. To examine this hypothesis, we consider three diﬀerent dependent variables: the
proportion of the male population that was smoking, the proportion of the total population that
was smoking, and the average number of cigarettes consumed per person. These variables are
observed as of 2002.
An important caveat is in order when it comes to these regressions: reverse causality is a priori
more serious here than in some of our previous regressions, because smoking has been prevalent
throughout the period and it directly causes adult mortality. Ideally, we would like to run a
regression using adult mortality net of smoking-related deaths as the regressor. Unfortunately, the
required data are not available for our sample. According to Mackay and Ericksen (2002), in 2002
4.2 million people died worldwide of tobacco-related causes, broadly deﬁned. With an overall world
death rate of 8.93 per thousand in 2002, this implies that 7.5% of deaths worldwide were directly
or indirectly attributable to tobacco. While this is not a very large share of overall deaths, the
regressions should be interpreted cautiously.
Table 8 displays our results. Across dependent variables, we ﬁnd evidence that adult mortality
is positively related to the prevalence of smoking and cigarette consumption, after controlling for
various other variables. The results are strongest when smoking is measured by the share of male
smokers, smoking being mostly a male phenomenon. A one standard deviation increase in adult
mortality is associated with an 11 percentage point increase in the proportion of male smokers (the
mean of this variable in our sample is 40.25%). The estimates are smaller in magnitude when the
dependent variable is the share of the total population that smokes, though adult mortality remains
statistically signiﬁcant. The smaller magnitude needs to be compared to the correspondingly smaller
mean of the dependent variable (27.40%), reﬂecting the fact that fewer women smoke than men.
Finally, adult mortality averaged over 1960-2000 is a moderately signiﬁcant predictor of the number
of cigarettes consumed per person in 2002 (column 6). The magnitude indicates that a one standard
deviation increase in adult mortality is associated with an increase in cigarettes consumed per person
of 311.15 (the mean number of cigarettes consumed per person in 2002 in our sample is 1211).
274.4 Summary
In this section, we have sought to characterize the partial correlations between adult mortality
and a variety of dependent variables: growth, investment, human capital accumulation, fertility,
and the propensity to smoke and to become infected with HIV/AIDS. We have found considerable
evidence that adult mortality is negatively associated with growth, investment and human capital
accumulation, and positively associated with fertility, smoking and the prevalence of AIDS. We also
found that the link between fertility and adult mortality seems central to the relationship between
death and development.
Together, these partial correlations paint a picture consistent with the conceptual framework
introduced in Section 2: a high rate of adult mortality is conducive to behavior that yields short-
term private beneﬁts at a long-term social cost, and is detrimental to behavior that yields long-term
social beneﬁts at a short-term private cost. We have explicitly refrained from interpreting these
partial correlations causally, recognizing that causality might run both ways and thereby biasing
the OLS coeﬃcient on mortality away from zero. We have instead examined whether the partial
correlations yielded magnitudes big enough for our story to have any potential to account for a
large portion of cross-country diﬀerences in economic performance. We have found this to be the
case, and turn to issues of causality in the following section.
5 A structural approach to mortality
In this section, we pursue an explicitly structural econometric approach to explore the partial
correlations uncovered in the previous section. This has two beneﬁts. First, it helps us deal with
the possibility of endogeneity in the mortality-growth relationship. Contrary to what would happen
if reverse causality were a major source of bias, we ﬁnd that instrumenting for adult mortality
actually increases the estimated eﬀect on growth. Second, using a system of equations allows us
to explore the relative importance of the channels through which mortality aﬀects growth. We
ﬁnd that fertility and physical-capital investment indeed account for most of the mortality-growth
connection. Surprisingly, human-capital investments, as measured by enrollment levels, do not
seem to play a substantial role.
285.1 The problem of reverse causality
Causality between mortality and development is likely to run both ways, as mentioned already.
In fact, reverse causality between income levels and mortality is a necessary condition for adult
mortality to generate a poverty trap. Countries with low income have high adult mortality, which
in turn makes it hard to grow out of poverty. If adult mortality is an important enough determinant
of growth, as we argue in this paper, then the vicious cycle between death and development might
explain a signiﬁcant portion of cross-country income diﬀerences.
Problems of reverse causality would be most pronounced had we run regressions of income levels
on adult mortality, since the level of income is clearly a strong determinant of mortality.32 Rich
countries typically have completed their demographic transitions, devote substantial resources to
health care and are thus characterized by lower mortality rates across the board. This is why we
focused on regressions of growth on mortality in Section 3: reverse causality is likely to be less
consequential in growth regressions, since the initial level of income appears as a control on the
right-hand side of the growth equation. Moreover, OLS coeﬃcients are useful to establish whether
adult mortality is a plausible candidate as a major explanation for economic performance, since
endogeneity bias would a priori increase the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on adult mortality. We
found that the magnitude of the partial correlation was indeed large.
However, it is still conceivable that growth speciﬁcations could be vulnerable to reverse causality.
Persistently slow-growing countries, for instance in Africa, may not be able to devote incremental
resources to ﬁghting diseases and improving medical infrastructure, thereby reducing mortality.
Hence, while controlling for income on the right-hand side mitigates the problem of reverse causality,
it may not eliminate it altogether. Reverse causality is also a potential concern in the investment,
school enrollment and fertility regressions presented above (although again, we controlled for initial
income in all of these regressions). In this section, we confront head-on the potential for reverse
causality in the growth, investment, human capital and fertility equations.
32However, several ﬁndings should lead to caution when advocating the view that there is a strong eﬀect of income
levels on mortality measures. Becker et al. (2005) show that the worldwide convergence in mortality rates has been
dramatic, despite the lack of convergence in income levels. Relatedly, Deaton (2004) argues that a variety of historical
and econometric evidence indicates that "the transmission of health knowledge and technology is as important as
changes in income" in determining current levels of mortality.
295.2 Speciﬁcation of the structural model
In order to deal with these issues, we formulate a structural model making explicit the causal links
between growth, the channels linking it to mortality, and the mortality variables themselves. The
channel variables we examine are those already discussed in Sections 2 and 4, namely investment
in physical capital, school enrollment and the rate of fertility. We explicitly relate the mortal-
ity variables to a set of exogenous variables to be used as instruments for mortality, now treated
as an endogenous regressor. These exogenous variables, to be further described below, relate to
the natural conditions for the prevalence of malaria ("malaria ecology"), climatic factors and geo-
graphic characteristics of the countries in the sample.33 Our structural system for the simultaneous
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⇒ Growth
This structural system entails two main assumptions. The ﬁr s ti st h a tt h et o t a le ﬀect of the
mortality variables on economic growth is exhausted by the channel variables that we speciﬁed.
In other words, there is no direct eﬀect of mortality on growth, so that the sum of the eﬀects of
m o r t a l i t yo ng r o w t ht h r o u g hi n v e s t m e n t ,e n r o l l m ent and fertility should be commensurate with the
total eﬀect of mortality estimated from a speciﬁcation of growth on mortality and other controls
(without controlling for the channel variables).34 The second assumption is that the only way that
malaria ecology, climatic factors and geographic features aﬀect growth is through their eﬀects on
the mortality variables. We will provide statistical tests of both of these critical assumptions below.
The speciﬁcation for the equations in the model follows closely those of Section 4. Speciﬁcally,
the speciﬁcation for the growth regression is that of column (5) of Table 3, with the mortality
33In a previous version of this paper, we used initial values and lagged values of the regressors as instruments. This
yielded results broadly consistent with those we report here. However, since this procedure requires assuming that
the endogenous regressors are predetermined, and since this assumption is not easily justiﬁable, we do not pursue
this approach further. The corresponding results are available upon request.
34In Table 3, when all channel variables were controlled for, adult mortality was no longer signiﬁcant in the growth
regression. This is consistent with the view that adult mortality has no direct eﬀect on growth. We further evaluate
this statement statistically below.
30variables excluded:
growthi = α1 + α2(log initial income per capita)i + α3(fertility)i + α4(investment rate)i
+α5(secondary enrollment)i + α6(government consumption)i + α7(openness)i
+α8(log of population)i + α9(openness ∗ log of population)i + εi (1)
where growth is measured in annual terms from 1960 to 2000, initial income is measured in 1960,
and the other regressors are time averages over 1960-2000.35 The functional forms for the channel
equations are exactly those of columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 6, which include the three mortality
variables.
5.3 Instrumental variables
5.3.1 Choice of variables
To address the endogeneity problem, we use three categories of variables as instruments for the
three mortality indicators: malaria ecology, climatic variables, and geographic features of countries.
We require several instruments because all three mortality variables are possibly endogenous and
we need at least one instrument per endogenous regressor. Moreover, additional instruments might
result in a better ﬁrst-stage ﬁt and allow for tests of overidentifying restrictions.
The malaria ecology index (ME), developed by Sachs et al. (2004), measures the exogenous
portion of malaria incidence. One drawback of using malaria incidence directly is that it is aﬀected
by human actions, and may thus depend on income (richer countries are better equipped to eradi-
cate the malaria vector).36 In contrast, the malaria ecology index combines “climatic factors, the
presence of diﬀerent mosquito vector types and the human biting rate of the diﬀerent mosquito
35This speciﬁcation corresponds quite closely to the one found in the cross-country growth literature, derived
from an augmented Solow model. It contains, on the right hand side, ﬂow measures of accumulation (investment,
enrollment) and depreciation of per capita quantities (fertility) - our channel variables. In addition, following the
ﬁndings in Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2001), we include "extent of the market" controls: openness, the log of
population, and the interaction of these two variables. Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1996), the speciﬁcation
includes the government consumption share of GDP. The latter two sets of variables are controls and are not central
to our analysis.
36This would also be a concern with any attempt to use the prevalence or mortality rates of other diseases as
instruments. Poor or poorly-run countries are more likely to suﬀer from a variety of diseases, especially prior to the
rapid diﬀusion of health knowledge that occurred in the post-World War II period.
31vectors” (Sachs et al., 2004) to generate a measure of potential malaria prevalence independent of
human activity. It is therefore plausibly exogenous in the sense of being unaﬀected causally by
growth and our channel variables, and yet correlated with malaria incidence and other tropical
diseases related to mortality. In fact, the raw correlation between ME and our measure of adult
mortality is 0.66 in a sample of 153 countries for which both variables are available.
To supplement the malaria ecology index, we use a collection of climate variables. Many diseases
require speciﬁc ranges of temperature, precipitation, and humidity to survive and spread. Mosquito-
born diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, and yellow fever require warm weather and standing
water. Inﬂuenza epidemics generally occur during cooler weather. Meningitis is more common
in dry environments (National Research Council, 2001). Cholera outbreaks are associated with
temperature and tidal ﬂuctuations (Lobitz et al., 2000). In addition, the climate will also aﬀect
mortality through its eﬀects on the variability of agricultural outcomes and even directly through
instances of extreme heat and cold. As a rough summary of climate, we use a set of variables
measuring the percentage of a country’s land located in each of the twelve climate zones.37 To
these variables we add a variable measuring the proportion of land with more than ﬁve days of frost
per month in winter, from Masters and McMillan (2001). Climate is strongly linked to mortality
rates: in the sample of 144 countries for which all these variables are available, a regression of adult
mortality on the climate variables together yields a joint F-test of 24.73 (with a p-value of 0.000)
a n da na d j u s t e dR2 of 0.38.38 In addition, climate is unaﬀected causally by investment, mortality,
or income growth.
Finally, our set of instruments includes measures of a country’s geographic features: the distance
of a country’s centroid from the equator, the mean distance to the nearest coastline, the average
elevation, and the log of land area. Again, these variables are causally unaﬀected by the variables
they are meant to instrument, but are related to climatic and possibly historical factors aﬀecting
37The 12 Koeppen-Geiger climate zones are: tropical rainforest climate (Af), monsoon variety of Af (Am), tropical
savannah climate (Aw), steppe climate (BS), desert climate(BW), mild humid climate with no dry season (Cf), mild
humid climate with a dry summer (Cs), mild humid climate with a dry winter (Cw), snowy-forest climate with a dry
winter (Dw), snowy-forest climate with a moist winter (Ds), tundra/polar ice climate (E) and highland climate (H).
Category E was eliminated from our list of instruments to avoid linear dependence.
38We discuss formal ﬁrst-stage F-tests for our instruments below. These involve a smaller sample (that used in the
IV regressions), additional exogenous controls not used as instruments, and varying sets of instruments, as described
below.
32mortality levels. In a regression of adult mortality on these geographic indicators alone, in a sample
of 123 countries, the F-statistic for their joint signiﬁcance has a value of 87.59 (with a p-value of
0.000) and an adjusted R2 of 0.52. These variables are valid instruments under the assumption
that they aﬀect the outcome of interest only through the regressors that are treated as endogenous,
a hypothesis we test statistically below.
In total we have 17 instruments, organized in three sets. We use various subsets of these variables
as instruments for adult mortality, the crude death rate and infant mortality. We do so in order to
examine the robustness of our estimated coeﬃcients to using diﬀerent sets of instruments, to address
the concern that some variables may not be excludable from the estimating equations. Speciﬁcally,
we present estimates using all sets of variables, and all three possible combinations of two sets.39
In addition, in order to control for the possible endogeneity of openness and the interaction term
between openness and the log of population, we add two commonly used instruments in some of our
IV regressions: the gravity-based measure of exogenous openness developed by Frankel and Romer
(1999) and its interaction with the log of population.
The ﬁrst concern we have is whether the instruments might be weak, which would bias IV
estimates towards OLS (see Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002 and Staiger and Stock, 1997). Table 9
presents F-statistics and Shea’s R2 statistics from ﬁrst stage regressions of each mortality variables
on the various instrument sets. The ﬁrst-stage relationships are generally quite strong, except when
the climate variables are excluded from the list of instruments.40 In other cases, Shea’s R2 statistic
takes values of up to 0.59 (for the ﬁrst stage of adult mortality when using all instruments). The
weak ﬁrst-stage relationship when only ME and geography are used as instruments suggests the
corresponding IV results might be unreliable.
39We also ran IV regressions using only malaria ecology to instrument for adult mortality, ﬁnding coeﬃcients that
are of magnitudes similar to those we report below. This amounts to treating the other mortality indicators as
exogenous, an undesirable assumption.
40Note that the Stock and Staiger rule of thumb for assessing the weakness of instruments states that instruments
are weak when the ﬁrst-stage F-test is smaller than 10. However, this rule of thumb only applies to the case of one
endogenous regressor. In our application, we have three. For this reason, we rely mostly on Shea’s R
2 as a measure
of ﬁrst-stage ﬁt.
335.3.2 IV estimates of the total eﬀect of mortality
In our ﬁrst pass at IV estimation of our structural model, we seek to characterize the total eﬀect of
the mortality variables, particularly adult mortality, on economic growth. To do so, we substitute
the channel equations into the growth equation. Given our chosen speciﬁcations for the channel
equations, the resulting "reduced form" growth speciﬁcation is as follows:41
growthi = β1 + β2(log initial income per capita)i + β3(adult mortality)i + β4(crude death rate)i
+β5(infant mortality)i + β6(government consumption)i + β7(population density)i
+β8(urbanization rate)i + β9(democracy index)i + β10(log of population)i
+β11(openness)i + β12(openness ∗ log of population)i + νi (2)
To estimate equation (2), we treat the three mortality indicators as endogenous, and the rest of the
control variables as exogenous, though in some speciﬁcations we allow openness and its interaction
with the log of population to be endogenous. When we do so we add to our list of instruments
the Frankel and Romer gravity-based measure of openness. The results are presented in Table 10.
Column (1) displays results using all three sets of instruments, treating openness and its interac-
tion with population as exogenous. The estimates of the mortality variables are all statistically
signiﬁcant, and in magnitude larger than those obtained with OLS. Running the OLS equivalent
of the speciﬁcation in column (1) yields an eﬀect of adult mortality equal to −6.32,w h e r e a st h e
IV coeﬃcient is equal to −8.56. IV estimates are larger than OLS estimates in magnitude, despite
theoretical priors to the contrary. This a common ﬁnding in this type of application.42 It may
suggest a reduced incidence of attenuation bias due to measurement error under IV.
The estimated eﬀects of the mortality variables are quite robust to the use of alternative sets
of instruments, and to treating openness and its interaction with log population as endogenous
(columns 2-8). One exception is when the list of instruments excludes the climate variables (columns
3 and 7). In this case, the estimated eﬀect of adult mortality, equal to −21.303 (column 3), is
perhaps unreasonably large, and the estimates on the other mortality variables are also sensitive to
41Reduced form is a slight misuse of language here: the mortality variables, which are treated as endogenous, still
appear on the right hand side. What we mean by "reduced form" is that we have substituted away the channel
variables in order to estimate the total eﬀect of mortality on growth. These are still IV estimates.
42See Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Frankel and Romer (2001), for instance, for applications where
this is the case.
34this choice of instruments. This is not surprising, as Table 9 suggests that the instruments in this
particular speciﬁcation are weak, as indicated by the small value of Shea’s R2.I n n o c a s e i s t h e
estimate on adult mortality smaller in magnitude than that of column (1), so to be conservative
we can use these estimates as a baseline for the total eﬀect of mortality. In terms of magnitudes,
a one-standard deviation increase in adult mortality in that speciﬁcation, is associated with a 1.16
percentage point reduction in economic growth, a large eﬀect.43
As a ﬁnal diagnostic test, we report Hansen J statistics to conduct tests of overidentifying
restrictions. This statistic, basically an extension of the Sargan statistic, is consistent in the presence
of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (the standard errors we present throughout this paper are
robust to both). The null hypothesis is a joint hypothesis that the error term is uncorrelated with
the instruments, and that the instruments are correctly excluded from the regression. In our baseline
speciﬁcation of column (1), the χ2(14)-distributed test statistic takes on a value of 13.55,w i t ha n
associated p-value of 0.48. Thus, we fail to reject the null of valid overidentifying restrictions. While
the power of this type of test may be low in the presence of other sources of misspeciﬁcation, we
can be heartened by the results: they do suggest that the only way our instruments aﬀect economic
growth is through the mortality variables jointly. This is a critical assumption to identify their
eﬀects.
These estimates, obtained by substituting away the channel variables in our structural sys-
tem, provide a notion of the total eﬀect of the mortality variables on growth. We now turn to
decomposing this total eﬀect into our three postulated channels of inﬂuence.
5.4 System estimates of the mortality-growth relationship
We argued above that the eﬀect of adult mortality is likely to work through investment in human
and physical capital, as well as fertility. We now quantify the relative importance of these channels.
To do so, we estimate directly the simultaneous-equations system described in Section 5.2. To
facilitate the readability and interpretation of our results, we depart slightly from the speciﬁcations
we have shown so far and use a single summary measure of mortality in the system: the adult
43We also explored speciﬁcations that include measures of institutional quality as a control. We instrumented
for institutions using Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) log of settler mortality variable. In the speciﬁcation of column 5,
including either expropriation risk or executive constraints as an additional regressor instrumented for with log
settler mortality had almost no eﬀect on the magnitude or signiﬁcance of adult mortality, estimated on the same
(much smaller) subsample for which settler mortality data was available. Results are available upon request.
35mortality rate, which we have argued is both the most theoretically appropriate and the most
consistently robust predictor of the channel variables and growth. We do this so that the growth
eﬀect of a single mortality variable can be traced out through the channel variables in an easy-
to-interpret way.44 Our baseline speciﬁcation of the growth and channel equations is otherwise
identical to what has been presented so far. The full speciﬁcation of our baseline model, along with
the estimates for each equation, are presented in Appendix 3, Table A3.
Our econometric methodology, relying on three-stage least squares estimation (3SLS), follows
that in Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) and Wacziarg (2001). As instruments, we use the three sets of
exogenous variables described above (malaria ecology, climate variables and geographic features).
In addition, the 3SLS methodology implies that the exogenous variables in the system that are
e x c l u d e df r o mag i v e ne q u a t i o na r eu s e da si n s t r u m e nts for the included endogenous variable(s) in
that equation. Joint estimation of the growth and channel equations allows us to take advantage of
possible cross-equation error correlations, resulting in gains in eﬃciency. An additional advantage of
this method is that we can compute a single covariance matrix for all the estimates in the system,
allowing for possibly complex inferences on functions of the parameters, even if they belong to
diﬀerent equations. For instance, we are interested in the eﬀect of adult mortality on growth
through each channel variable, which is the eﬀect of mortality on the channel multiplied by the
eﬀect of the channel on growth. We are also interested in inference on the sum of these channel
eﬀects. Below, we present Wald tests for these hypotheses based on nonlinear functions of the
system estimates.
The results of our baseline system estimation are in Table 11. The total eﬀect of adult mortality
on growth through the three channels is equal to −6.25, implying that a one standard deviation
increase in adult mortality is associated with a 0.85 percentage point decrease in growth. If our
model is well speciﬁed, the sum of the channel eﬀects should be commensurate with IV estimates
of the total eﬀect of adult mortality from Table 10. The total eﬀect we estimate here is slightly
smaller than the total eﬀect estimated in column (1) of Table 10, where the estimate was −8.56, but
it is in the 95% conﬁdence interval of that estimate. This suggests that our three channels capture
most if not all of the total eﬀect of adult mortality on economic growth. Further evidence of the
44The estimated eﬀect of adult mortality is not very sensitive to the inclusion of the other mortality variables in
the system. System estimates that include these variables are available upon request. These estimates are harder to
interpret since the scales of our three mortality variables are diﬀerent, so we would have to present 9 channel eﬀects,
and 3 total eﬀects (adult mortality, infant mortality and the crude death rate, respectively).
36exhaustiveness of the channels can be obtained by running a simple OLS regression of the residuals
from the growth equation on adult mortality. The resulting estimate on the adult mortality variable
is equal to −0.23, and is statistically indistinguishable from zero (the t-statistic is equal to −0.24).
T h u s ,w ec a nb eq u i t ec o n ﬁdent that our three channels exhaustively capture the eﬀect of adult
mortality on economic growth.
Turning to the channels themselves, we note that, consistent with the observations based on OLS
estimates in Section 4, adult mortality is negatively related to the investment rate and secondary
enrollment, but positively related to the fertility rate. The investment eﬀect (−20.85)i sv e r yc l o s e
in magnitude to the OLS estimate in column (2) of Table 6 (−20.64). Similarly, the enrollment and
fertility eﬀects are close to those we reported earlier (a little smaller for enrollment, a little bigger
for fertility), and all of these eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant at the 7% level or better. As for the
eﬀects of the channels on growth, physical capital investment bears a positive eﬀect and fertility a
negative one, in line with the predictions of the Solow model. However, the enrollment eﬀect comes
out negative and statistically insigniﬁcant (the eﬀect was also insigniﬁcant in the OLS estimates of
Table 3, although it was positive). This is consistent with the general diﬃculty economists have
had in pinning down a robust relationship between human-capital variables and economic growth
(Pritchett, 1996; Bils and Klenow, 2001, Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994).
These results suggest that the main channels through which adult mortality aﬀects growth are
physical-capital investment and fertility: the eﬀect of adult mortality on economic growth through
physical-capital investment is equal to −3.82, and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 6% level. The
fertility eﬀect is −3.87,a n di ss i g n i ﬁcant at the 0.4% level. The eﬀect through enrollment, which
bears the opposite sign from that expected, is small (+1.44) and statistically insigniﬁcant even at
the 10% level.45
To conclude, the eﬀect of adult mortality on economic growth seems predominantly due to the
eﬀects on fertility and on investment, in roughly equal proportions. Secondary enrollment does not
seem to be an important channel, though adult mortality does aﬀect enrollment negatively, in line
45If human capital investment and fertility are jointly determined by parents, and the quantity-quality tradeoﬀ
operates as suggested in Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) and Soares (2004), then it may be that fertility (which is well-
measured) could be proxying for human capital investment (which is imperfectly measured). That is, parents in high
fertility countries would be under-investing not only in the measured portion of education (secondary enrollment)
but in other unmeasured aspects of childcare and education quality. Without a more comprehensive and accurate
cross-national measure of human capital investment, however, this remains conjecture.
37with theory.
5.5 Summary
A consistent picture emerges from our attempts to account for endogeneity in the growth-adult
mortality relationship. The overall eﬀect of adult mortality on growth comes out negative and
statistically signiﬁcant. The magnitudes vary somewhat, but a reasonable estimate of the total
eﬀect of adult mortality on growth, from Tables 10 and 11 seems to be in the range of −6 to −10.
With such a range of estimates, a one standard deviation increase in mortality is associated with
a reduction in the annual economic growth rate of between 0.8 and 1.4 percentage points, slightly
larger than the corresponding magnitude from the benchmark OLS estimate in column 4 of Table 3.
Channel estimates suggest that fertility and investment are important mediating channels linking
adult mortality to growth. Consistent with our theoretical priors, adult mortality also reduces
secondary school enrollment. However, in line with past ﬁndings in the literature on human capital
and growth, the eﬀect of the schooling on growth is not robust.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We opened this paper with a straightforward observation: the short time horizon induced by high
mortality causes people to take actions that yield short-term beneﬁts at long-term costs. We ﬁnd
evidence of this eﬀect across a range of data using multiple econometric approaches.
Mortality matters: adult mortality alone can account for all of Africa’s growth shortfall over
the 1960-2000 period. Furthermore, adult mortality is a signiﬁcantly negative predictor of physical
capital investment rates, enrollment rates in secondary education, and growth of per capita GDP.
These eﬀects are economically large. In addition, mortality is a signiﬁcantly positive predictor of
fertility rates as well as a variety of measures of risky behavior, such as the prevalence of smoking
and AIDS infection rates.
We explored three channels whereby adult mortality may aﬀect growth: investment, human-
capital accumulation and the fertility rate. Each of the channels operates in the expected direction,
but the strongest linkage is through fertility. The demographic transition accounts for much of
the high correlation between fertility and adult mortality: countries with high fertility and high
mortality, that are in the early stages of their transitions, and countries with low mortality and
38low fertility, that have completed it, dominate the variation. The demographic transition is char-
acterized by a fall in mortality followed by a fall in fertility. This timing suggests that causality
runs mostly from mortality to fertility, rather than the reverse. In light of the importance of the
fertility channel in our empirical results, further theoretical and empirical research on the impact
of falling mortality on fertility rates seems called for.
Overall, the results of this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that short horizons are a
ﬁrst order problem of development: high adult mortality induces economic agents to invest less,
accumulate less human capital, have a large number of children rather than fewer, high quality ones.
This, in turns, lowers economic growth. Low growth means that countries, especially in Africa,
are unable to devote resources to ﬁghting diseases and reducing mortality. At a minimum, high
adult mortality has hindered developing countries’ economic growth. At its worst, the negative link
between death and development may lead to self-perpetuating poverty.
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Appendix 1 – Data on Mortality  
 
Table A1 - Income, Growth and Mortality: Data 














Sweden 17004 2.108 0.009 0.011  0.126
Iceland 16479 2.758 0.009 0.007  0.129
Netherlands 16077 2.417 0.010 0.008  0.130
Israel 11402 2.795 0.018 0.007  0.132
Greece 10214 3.137 0.025 0.009  0.138
Norway 16635 2.973 0.011 0.010  0.140
Switzerland 21766 1.418 0.011 0.009  0.141
Japan 15591 4.230 0.012 0.007  0.146
Cyprus 7930 . 0.019 0.009  0.146
United Kingdom  15016 2.075 0.013 0.011  0.151
Denmark 18661 2.211 0.011 0.011  0.151
Spain 11476 3.397 0.020 0.008  0.152
Italy 14719 2.878 0.021 0.010  0.152
Ireland 11118 4.091 0.015 0.010  0.155
Canada 18238 2.380 0.014 0.007  0.155
Malta 13106 . 0.018 0.008  0.157
Australia 17338 2.177 0.012 0.008  0.162
Puerto Rico  9709 . 0.023 0.007  0.165
New Zealand  15118 1.222 0.014 0.008  0.165
Belgium 15631 2.794 0.016 0.011  0.166
Germany 17494 . 0.016 .  0.168
Costa Rica  4667 1.310 0.037 0.005  0.170
Yugoslavia . . 0.044 0.010  0.170
Cuba 6167 . 0.023 0.007  0.172
Barbados 9587 3.938 0.032 0.009  0.173
Turkey 4657 2.332 0.104 0.011  0.175
Kuwait 23386 . 0.038 0.005  0.175
Portugal 9025 3.839 0.036 0.010  0.177
Hong Kong  13709 5.391 0.017 0.005  0.177
Brunei . . 0.031 0.006  0.178
United Arab Emirates  . . 0.051 0.008  0.179
Austria 15232 2.929 0.018 0.012  0.180
Uruguay 7103 1.234 0.034 0.010  0.182
France 15547 2.625 0.014 0.010  0.186
Luxembourg 21526 3.310 0.015 0.011  0.188
Jamaica 3602 0.741 0.033 0.007  0.192
Panama 4616 2.398 0.037 0.007  0.192
U.S.A. 21500 2.495 0.015 0.009  0.197
Paraguay 3903 1.645 0.045 0.008  0.197
Bulgaria 6164 . 0.025 0.011  0.197














Singapore 10649 . 0.015 0.005  0.198
Albania 2771 . 0.065 0.007  0.200
Iran 4436 2.024 0.094 0.012  0.201
Argentina 9249 1.002 0.039 0.008  0.201
Armenia 2399 . 0.027 0.007  0.202
Bahrain 13261 . 0.043 0.007  0.205
Sri Lanka  2059 2.266 0.044 0.007  0.209
Finland 14996 2.889 0.011 0.009  0.209
Czech Republic  12962 . 0.015 0.012  0.211
Slovenia 13181 . 0.018 0.010  0.217
Venezuela 8063 -0.500 0.036 0.006  0.218
Romania 3389 3.544 0.038 0.010  0.219
Trinidad & Tobago  8208 2.347 0.037 0.007  0.220
Qatar 19844 . 0.039 0.009  0.222
Tajikistan 1198 . . 0.009  0.224
Mexico 6557 1.973 0.058 0.008  0.227
Lithuania 6755 . 0.026 0.010  0.229
Poland 7032 . 0.028 0.009  0.231
Dominican Republic  2867 2.836 0.072 0.010  0.232
Chile 5715 2.366 0.049 0.008  0.233
Algeria 4174 1.521 0.099 0.012  0.235
Georgia 4971 . 0.034 .  0.236
Tunisia 4078 . 0.088 0.011  0.238
Ecuador 3295 1.371 0.065 0.010  0.241
Lebanon 4705 . 0.042 0.010  0.243
Brazil 5199 2.773 0.072 0.009  0.243
Hungary 8357 . 0.027 0.013  0.247
Suriname . . 0.045 0.008  0.248
Fiji 4116 . 0.040 0.007  0.249
Uzbekistan 2652 . . .  0.250
Bahamas 16527 . 0.031 0.006  0.251
Colombia 4083 1.888 0.049 0.008  0.252
Egypt 2544 2.602 0.115 0.014  0.258
Azerbaijan 2368 . 0.092 0.007  0.258
Mauritius 6920 3.711 0.040 0.007  0.260
Belarus 7174 . 0.023 0.010  0.268
Ukraine 6453 . 0.024 0.011  0.269
Malaysia 5071 3.859 0.035 0.008  0.270
Iraq . . 0.082 0.013  0.273
Latvia 7029 . 0.022 0.012  0.274
Morocco 2837 2.611 0.091 0.013  0.274
Estonia 7943 . 0.023 0.012  0.276
Turkmenistan 4533 . 0.087 0.009  0.282
Saudi Arabia  12246 . 0.082 0.012  0.284














China 1484 4.261 0.071 0.011  0.289
Libya . . 0.074 0.011  0.290
Thailand 3331 4.595 0.056 0.009  0.291
Korea, Rep. of  6485 5.906 0.032 0.008  0.291
Peru 4438 0.879 0.089 0.011  0.292
Vietnam 1379 . 0.046 0.012  0.292
CapeVerde 2015 3.496 0.067 0.011  0.293
India 1365 2.684 0.108 0.015  0.294
Korea, Dem. Rep.  . . 0.044 0.009  0.295
Honduras 2063 0.468 0.081 0.011  0.296
Seychelles 6587 3.049 . .  0.296
Pakistan 1283 2.885 0.107 0.016  0.299
Nicaragua 3065 -1.218 0.083 0.011  0.300
Moldova 2211 . 0.042 .  0.310
El Salvador  3999 0.732 0.081 0.010  0.313
Russian Federation  7780 . 0.029 .  0.314
Kyrgyzstan 2787 . 0.092 .  0.315
Philippines 2791 1.327 0.054 0.009  0.334
Kazakhstan 6199 . . .  0.334
Oman 16668 . 0.080 0.013  0.336
Mongolia 1268 . 0.093 0.012  0.344
Bolivia 2664 0.365 0.111 0.015  0.366
Guatemala 3371 1.282 0.090 0.012  0.370
Liberia . . 0.168 0.021  0.378
Madagascar 1045 -0.985 0.103 0.017  0.380
Indonesia 2050 3.397 0.081 0.014  0.392
Myanmar (Burma)  . . 0.111 0.016  0.397
Bangladesh 1171 1.163 0.115 0.017  0.398
Yemen 901 . 0.149 0.019  0.402
Nepal 978 1.570 0.129 0.018  0.410
Ghana 1171 1.111 0.095 0.014  0.417
Haiti 1077 . 0.126 0.016  0.418
Swaziland 5268 . 0.112 0.016  0.452
Papua New Guinea  3104 . 0.093 0.015  0.456
Cambodia 1220 . 0.117 0.019  0.461
Gabon 7454 2.552 0.104 0.019  0.462
Congo, Republic Of  1443 3.250 0.099 0.018  0.470
Benin 1067 0.324 0.132 0.019  0.471
Kenya 1118 1.117 0.086 0.015  0.473
Lesotho 1186 2.060 0.114 0.016  0.475
Togo 1156 -0.073 0.115 0.019  0.476
Zimbabwe 2329 1.756 0.076 0.014  0.477
Mauritania 1524 . 0.138 0.020  0.486
Cote d'Ivoire  2237 0.345 0.137 0.018  0.489














Ethiopia 581 0.466 0.146 0.023  0.498
Namibia 4607 . 0.088 0.015  0.505
Mali 840 -0.034 0.190 0.023  0.506
Laos 1367 . 0.129 0.019  0.509
Botswana 3362 . 0.080 0.013  0.509
Cameroon 2018 0.487 0.113 0.017  0.511
Burkina Faso  781 0.594 0.142 0.022  0.513
Sudan 1159 . 0.090 0.018  0.514
Senegal 1567 -0.285 0.127 0.020  0.514
Tanzania 531 0.584 0.117 0.017  0.516
Afghanistan . . 0.186 0.025  0.519
SouthAfrica 7124 1.047 0.066 0.012  0.520
Chad 1092 -0.721 0.141 0.023  0.520
Guinea-Bissau 546 1.193 0.169 0.025  0.520
Uganda 659 1.295 0.104 0.019  0.520
Malawi 601 1.568 0.163 0.024  0.522
Nigeria 1024 -0.948 0.126 0.018  0.522
Mozambique 1290 -1.051 0.153 0.021  0.530
Burundi 715 -0.059 0.125 0.020  0.539
Niger 1196 -1.546 0.190 0.025  0.541
Angola 2262 . 0.177 0.024  0.541
Djibouti 2103 . 0.141 0.020  0.542
Rwanda 933 -0.116 0.119 0.022  0.542
Guinea 2555 0.066 0.169 0.024  0.542
Gambia, The  1157 0.748 0.146 0.024  0.544
Central African Republic  1727 . 0.137 0.021  0.547
Zambia 1175 -0.756 0.106 0.018  0.559
Somalia . . 0.147 0.024  0.561
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Nagaland 1925  . 0.020 .  0.031  0.160
A_&_N_Islands 2505 . 0.030 0.006 0.033  0.221
Tripura 1602  4.85 0.052 0.008 0.040  0.233
West_Bengal 2102  4.25 0.063 0.008 0.043  0.236
Delhi 5192  . 0.031 0.006 0.044  0.229
Kerala 1791  4.52 0.015 0.006 0.045  0.197
Gujarat 2603  7.73 0.065 0.008 0.052  0.266
Rajasthan 1901  4.48 0.082 0.009 0.053  0.254
Maharashtra 3410  6.26 0.054 0.008 0.054  0.236
Sikkim 3298  . 0.052 0.007 0.055  0.247
Himachal_Pradesh 2202  . 0.069 0.009 0.058  0.226
Haryana 3428  2.42 0.068 0.008 0.059  0.223
Pondicherry 3166  . 0.018 0.007 0.059  0.310
Goa 4803  4.71 0.023 0.007 0.060  0.314
Karnataka 2007  2.85 0.065 0.008 0.061  0.273
Uttar_Pradesh 1620  1.64 0.091 0.011 0.061  0.259
Bihar 1171  -1.13 0.070 0.010 0.062  0.268
Andhra_Pradesh 1744  3.21 0.069 0.009 0.065  0.288
Tamil_Nadu 2208  4.15 0.055 0.008 0.066  0.274
Madhya_Pradesh 1658  3.64 0.107 0.012 0.066  0.286
Punjab 3659  2.54 0.052 0.007 0.066  0.232
Orissa 1358  1.01 0.110 0.011 0.067  0.299
Assam 1509  0.91 0.078 0.010 0.069  0.336
Manipur 1696  . 0.025 0.006 0.070  0.239
Arunachal_Pradesh 2636  0.69 0.052 0.009 0.074 0.274
Meghalaya 1681  1.10 0.052 0.009 0.075  0.285
Correlation between two last columns is 0.7. 
   50
Appendix 2 – Description of variables and data sources 
 
A . Cross-national dataset 
 
Variable  Source and definition 
Log income per capita  Log of PPP real income per capita, Chain index 
Source: Penn World Tables, v. 6.1 
Growth of income per capita  Annual growth of PPP real income per capita, Chain index 
Source: Penn World Tables, v. 6.1 
Investment share of GDP  Investment in constant prices/GDP in constant prices, % 
Source: Penn World Tables, v. 6.1 
Government consumption share 
of GDP 
Government consumption in constant prices/GDP in constant prices, %. 
Source: Penn World Tables, v. 6.1 
Imports plus exports over GDP 
(openness) 
(Imports+Exports in constant prices)/GDP in constant prices, % 
Source: Penn World Tables, v. 6.1 
Log of population  Log of population in 1000s.  
Source: Penn World Tables, v. 6.1 
Adult mortality rate  Probability of a male surviving to age 60, conditional on surviving to age 15. 
Source: World Bank WDI 
Infant mortality rate  Probability of an infant dying before age one.  
Source: World Bank WDI 
Crude death rate  Proportion of the total population dying in a given year.  
Source: World Bank WDI 
Total fertility rate  Expected number of births per woman, based on age-specific fertility rates.  
Source: World Bank WDI  
Urbanization rate, %  Urban population / total population, % 
Source: World Bank WDI 
Secondary school gross 
enrollment ratio 
Rate of enrollment in secondary school 
Source: Barro-Lee dataset 
Interstate battle 
deaths/population 
Total estimated battle deaths summed over interstate wars 1960-1997, divided 
by average population over 1960-2000. Countries where a war occurred but no 
reliable battle death estimates are available are coded as missing data.  
Source: COW dataset. 
Intrastate battle 
deaths/population 
Total estimated battle deaths summed over intrastate wars 1960-1997, divided 
by average population over 1960-2000. Countries where a war occurred but no 
reliable battle death estimates are available are coded as missing data.  
Source: COW dataset 
Months of interstate war  Total months between 1960 and 1997 in which the country was involved in 
interstate war, with double-counting for multiple wars. Source: COW dataset 
Months of intrastate war  Total months between 1960 and 1997 in which the country was involved in 
intrastate war, with double-counting for multiple wars. Source: COW dataset 
Democracy Index  Freedom House index of political rights. 
Source: Freedom House 
Revolutions  Revolutions per year, attempted or successful, 1980-1999 average 
Source: Arthur Banks CNTS dataset   51
Variable  Source and definition 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy  Source: CIA World Factbook 
Dummy for landlocked country  Source: CIA World Factbook 
Dummy for island  Source: CIA World Factbook 
Log of Land area in square km  Source: CIA World Factbook 
Distance from equator  Absolute value of latitude/90.  
Source: CIA World Factbook  
Dummy for Catholic majority  Source: Alesina et al. 
Dummy for Muslim majority  Source: Alesina et al. 
Ethnic fractionalization  Source: Alesina et al. 
Death rate from AIDS per 1000, 
2001 
Death rate from AIDS in adults and children, 2001, per 1000. 
Source: UNAIDS 
% adults (15-49) living with 
AIDS, end 2003 
AIDS prevalence rate among adults aged 15-49, end 2003. 
Source: UNAIDS 
Adults smoking, %, male  % of males smoking, 2000 or latest available data. 
Source: Mackay and Ericksen 
Adults smoking, %, total  % of adults smoking, 2000 or latest available data. 
Source: Mackay and Ericksen 
Cigarette consumption per 
capita, 1000s, 2002 
Per capita cigarette consumption figures constructed from production, trade 
(import and export) and population data. 
Source: Mackay and Ericksen 
Distance from coast  Mean distance to nearest coastline (km).  
Source: Gallup et al.  
Elevation  Mean elevation in meters above sea level.  
Source: Gallup et al. 
Koeppen-Geiger climate zones  11 variables measuring the fraction of land area in each of the Koeppen-Geiger 
climate zones, polar and tundra zones omitted. 
Source: Gallup et al. 
ME  Malaria ecology index. This index combines “climatic factors, the presence of 
different mosquito vector types and the human biting rate of the different 
mosquito vectors” to generate a measure of potential malaria prevalence 
independent of human activity. 
Source: Sachs malaria dataset 
Frost  Proportion of land with more than five frost days per months in winter.  
Source: Masters-McMillan dataset 
Frankel-Romer instrument [FR]  Portion of a country’s total trade volume (as a percentage of GDP) constructed 
by summing the geography-determined portion of bilateral trade shares.  
Source: Frankel and Romer. 
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B. India dataset 
 
Log of per Capita Income in 
Period Initial Year 
Indian National Accounts 
Mortality rate, male, ages 20-
40 
Source: Registrar General, Govt. of India. 
 
Death rate, all ages  Source: Registrar General, Govt. of India. 
 
Infant mortality rate, per 1000 
live births 
Source: Registrar General, Govt. of India. 
 
Total fertility rate, avg. of first 
5 years of each decade 
Source: Registrar General, Govt. of India. 
 
Urbanization Rate, %  Source: Census of India 
Population density, inhab/sq 
km 
Source: Census of India 
Religious Fractionalization   1-Herfindahl index of religion shares. Constructed from data on religions by 
states. Source: Census of India  
Share of scheduled castes and 
tribes, % 
Source: Census of India 
Literacy rate, %  Source: Census of India 
Share of development 
expenditures in NSDP, % 
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Appendix 3 – System Estimates 
 
Table A3 - 3SLS estimates of the baseline system specification 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Growth  Investment  Human  capital  Fertility 
Adult mortality rate  -20.848 -0.509  5.681
 (1.97)** (2.84)**  (4.72)**
Investment share of   0.183  
GDP, %  (5.59)**  
Secondary school gross   -2.840 -6.930  -3.463
enrollment ratio  (1.82)* (0.11)  (4.25)**
Total fertility rate  -0.681  
  (3.36)**  
Log income per capita,   -0.947 -3.007 0.037  -0.252
1960 (4.24)** (2.00)** (1.41)  (1.47)
Government consumption share   -0.025  
of GDP, %  (1.75)*  
(Imports+Exports)/GDP, %  0.043  
 (1.94)*  
Log of population  0.308  
 (2.11)**  
Openness*log of population  -0.004  
 (1.53)  
Log per capita income *   3.403  
Enrollment (0.56)  
Democracy index  -0.141 
 (1.98)** 
Urbanization rate, %  0.002  0.008
  (1.55) (1.21)
Population density  0.138  -1.570
  (1.29) (2.23)**
Constant 6.800 40.045 0.097  5.053
 (2.01)** (2.71)** (0.46)  (3.75)**
Observations 81 81 81  81
R-squared 0.45 0.53 0.79  0.84
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. 
Instruments for adult mortality in the channel regressions: Malaria ecology, climate variables, geography 
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Table 4 - OLS growth estimates: extensions and robustness. 
Dependent Variable: Growth of per capita income, annual, 1960-2000 
 
 















Log income per capita,   -1.014  -1.179 -1.605 -1.258 -1.297  -1.364 -1.080
1960 (4.65)**  (4.54)** (4.44)** (4.89)** (5.17)**  (5.21)** (4.12)**
Adult mortality rate    -6.531 -6.664 -4.543 -3.654  -4.880 -6.858
   (2.82)** (2.48)** (2.10)** (1.47)  (2.12)** (3.18)**
Sub-Saharan Africa   -1.015  0.224  
Dummy (2.83)**  (0.39)  
Interstate battle    1.972 2.129 
deaths/population   (1.59) (1.81)* 
Intrastate battle    -0.034 -0.008 
deaths/population   (0.71) (0.15) 
Months of interstate    0.005 
War   (1.02) 
Months of intrastate    -0.001 
War   (1.87)* 
Risk of expropriation,       0.259
1990     (2.02)**
Constraints on executive,      0.032
1970/1990 avg.      (0.34)
Crude death rate    66.373 43.296 47.197  60.663 142.022
   (0.60) (0.75) (0.78)  (1.04) (2.50)**
Infant mortality rate    -2.339 -15.731 -19.073  -15.205 -23.381
   (0.18) (2.81)** (3.11)**  (2.36)** (3.74)**
Total fertility rate    -0.720  
   (2.96)**  
Government   -0.034  -0.035 -0.064 -0.042 -0.047  -0.029 -0.030
Consumption / GDP, %  (2.27)**  (2.16)** (2.27)** (2.45)** (2.75)**  (1.65) (1.72)*
Investment share of   0.067  0.056 0.085 0.046 0.060  0.042 0.028
GDP, %  (3.36)**  (2.70)** (3.26)** (2.01)** (3.29)**  (2.04)** (1.49)
Secondary school   3.763  2.601 -0.698 1.156 0.494  0.769 -0.322
gross enrollment ratio  (3.67)**  (2.68)** (0.44) (0.93) (0.42)  (0.66) (0.22)
(Imports+Exports)/,   0.044  0.043 0.049 0.043 0.043  0.029 0.074
GDP %  (3.14)**  (3.75)** (1.95)* (3.25)** (3.16)**  (3.37)** (2.83)**
Log of population  0.331  0.375 0.233 0.369 0.361  0.271 0.531
 (3.27)**  (4.02)** (1.40) (4.17)** (4.01)**  (3.28)** (3.61)**
Openness*log of   -0.004  -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004  -0.002 -0.007
Population (2.25)**  (2.54)** (1.10) (2.41)** (2.50)**  (2.25)** (2.44)**
Constant 4.825  7.798 15.533 9.261 9.683  8.775 6.533
 (2.14)**  (2.81)** (3.48)** (3.50)** (3.50)**  (3.35)** (2.45)**
Observations 89  86 40 81 81  79 73
Adjusted R-squared  0.63  0.66 0.71 0.69 0.71  0.68 0.61
Robust t statistics in parentheses ; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%         
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Table 7 - OLS estimates of the AIDS equation, cross-country data. 
   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Death Rate from AIDS,  
per 1,000, 2001 
% Adults (15-49) living with  
AIDS, end 2003 
Log per capita   0.252  0.177 0.920 1.357  1.104 2.663
income, 1990  (0.50)  (0.22) (0.97) (1.27)  (0.82) (1.62)
Adult mortality rate,   11.013  14.123 15.597 28.898  37.112 38.597
male, 1960-1980 avg.  (2.45)**  (2.25)** (2.12)** (3.09)**  (2.70)** (2.15)**
Death rate,     -113.889 -334.768   -296.948 -824.568
1960-1980 avg.    (0.70) (1.22)   (1.00) (1.36)
Infant mortality rate,     -24.255 1.588   -29.891 41.562
1960-1980 avg.    (2.31)** (0.08)   (1.76)* (0.99)
Fertility rate, total     0.714 0.504   0.953 0.762
1990   (1.53) (0.99)   (1.19) (0.77)
Index of political     1.303   2.576
Rights, 1990    (0.59)   (0.52)
Revolutions,     -1.502   -3.238
1980-1999 average    (1.53)   (1.60)
Population density,     -0.723   -1.488
1990   (1.88)*   (2.24)**
Dummy for    3.436   6.075
Landlocked country    (2.06)**   (1.99)*
Dummy for island    -0.310   0.354
   (0.51)   (0.29)
Log land area,     -0.078   -0.133
square km    (0.53)   (0.43)
Dummy for Catholic     -1.095   -2.036
Majority   (1.11)   (1.18)
Dummy for Muslim     -2.392   -6.294
Majority   (2.50)**   (3.47)**
Distance from Equator    2.614   8.708
   (0.88)   (1.23)
Ethnic     0.341   0.402
Fractionalization   (0.21)   (0.11)
Number of years of     -0.226   -0.546
schooling, 1990    (0.87)   (1.09)
Constant -4.427  -3.940 -7.941 -17.989  -15.479 -25.305
 (0.79)  (0.47) (1.05) (1.54)  (1.13) (1.71)*
Observations 97  95 79 110  108 85
Adjusted  R-squared  0.19 0.24 0.38 0.22 0.24 0.35
Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.   62
Table 8 - OLS estimates of the Tobacco Consumption equation. 
Dependent Variable: See below 
 
  Adults smoking, %, 
male 




capita, 1000s, 2002 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
Log income per capita,   -0.034  -0.039 0.025 0.018 0.271  -0.084
1960  (1.38) (1.08) (1.36) (0.59) (2.72)** (0.62)
Adult mortality rate  -0.000  0.805 0.103 0.330 -2.752  2.288
 (0.00)  (2.67)** (0.68) (1.74)* (3.97)**  (1.87)*
Infant mortality rate    2.037 1.541   0.857
   (1.67)* (1.47)   (0.21)
Crude death rate    -24.894 -8.856   -46.224
   (2.87)** (1.38)   (1.42)
Urbanization rate, %    -0.000 0.000   0.004
   (0.13) (0.14)  (0.81)
Population  density   -0.037 -0.028  -0.034
   (1.54) (1.38)  (0.30)
Total fertility rate    -0.083 -0.043   -0.389
   (4.00)** (2.40)**  (3.46)**
Distance from Equator    -0.015 0.012   1.477
   (0.11) (0.12)   (2.26)**
Dummy for Muslim     0.082 0.004   0.178
Majority   (1.75)* (0.11)   (1.21)
Dummy for Catholic     0.039 0.041   0.114
Majority   (1.34) (1.72)*  (0.85)
Constant  0.651 0.931 0.036 0.177 -0.190 2.530
  (2.69)** (3.47)** (0.19) (0.78) (0.19) (2.13)**
Observations  80 77 86 83 92 90
Adjusted  R-squared  0.03 0.19 0.01 0.04 0.48 0.61
Robust t statistics in parentheses ; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.       
All regressors except initial income 1960 appear as averages of available years over 1960-2000. 
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